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   Abstract 
 
Securitization offers a range of benefits for Asia’s financial systems and economies as a 
mechanism to assist funding and investment. As a form of structured finance, reliable and 
efficient securitization an assist development by enabling financial systems to deepen and 
strengthen—thus contributing to overall economic growth and stability.  
 
It must be recognized, however, that there are both overt and more subtle risks in certain uses 
of securitization. The credit and liquidity crisis that began in the United States and spread to 
other developed financial systems in mid-2007 exposed the danger associated with 
securitization: excessive risk-taking or regulatory capital arbitrage rather than a tool to assist 
more conventional or conservative approaches to funding, risk management, or investment. 
Securitization has also been criticized for rendering financial markets opaque, while contributing 
to a growing emphasis in the global economy of credit intermediation conducted in capital 
markets rather than through banks. 
 
This study examines the institutional basis of these concerns by investigating the use of 
securitization in East Asia, questioning both the growth in regional activity since the 1997/98 
Asian financial crisis, and the reasons for it remaining constrained. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of proposals to support proper development of securitization in the region, including 
institutional mechanisms that could better allow securitization to enhance development and 
financial stability. If East Asia begins to make fuller use of securitization, its motive will be to 
meet funding or investment needs in the real economy rather than balance sheet arbitrage of 
the kind that peaked elsewhere in 2007. 
 
 
Keywords: Securitization, East Asia, debt markets, risk transfer. 
 
JEL Classifications: F3, G2, K2. 
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I. Introduction 
 
“We shall not cease from exploration 
  And the end of all our exploring 
 Will be to arrive where we started 
 And know the place for the first time.” 
 T.S. Eliot  
Four Quartets, Little Gidding, V 
 
This study questions whether the effectiveness of the financial systems of certain Asian 
economies can benefit from improved access to securitization as a form of market-based 
financial intermediation. The practical implication would be a greater reliance on the public and 
private securities markets in capital funding and portfolio investment, to complement traditional 
bank lending on which both newly-industrialized and developing East Asian economies now 
largely depend.
1 Given the general loss of confidence and liquidity in global credit markets and 
structured finance that began in mid-2007, this paper also examines how credit risk transfer and 
regulatory incentives to securitization will be re-assessed beyond the changes contemplated by 
the incoming revisions to the Basel capital accords. 
 
Commercial interests have insisted since the early 1990s that structured finance has 
considerable potential in Asia. It was also accepted as a valuable tool in the restructuring of 
financial sector claims in the Republic of Korea (Korea) after 2000. Yet the overall development 
of securitization in the region is modest compared with Europe or North America, despite the 
fact that many national authorities have encouraged its use since the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis. This prompts the question whether this aspect of financial development lags other regions 
as a function of time, as a matter of national institutional conditions, or as the result of certain 
economic conditions—such as national savings and investment imbalances or relatively high 
banking sector liquidity. If effective securitization can support financial sector development and 
efficiency, which contribute to economic objectives such as growth and financial stability,
2 then it 
may be valuable both commercially and socially to promote its use. 
 
However, it must be recognized that there are both overt and more subtle risks in certain uses 
of securitization. The credit and liquidity crisis that began in the United States (US) and spread 
to other developed financial systems in mid-2007 exposed the danger associated with 
securitization in excessive risk-taking or regulatory capital arbitrage, rather than as a tool to 
assist a more conventional or conservative approach to funding, risk management, or 
investment. Securitization has also been criticized for rendering financial markets opaque, while 
contributing to a growing emphasis in the global economy of credit intermediation conducted in 
capital markets rather than through banks.
3 
 
This study examines the institutional basis of these concerns by investigating the use of 
securitization in East Asia, questioning both the growth in regional activity since the 1997/98 
Asian financial crisis, and the reasons for it remaining constrained. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of proposals to support proper development of securitization in the region, including 
institutional mechanisms that could better allow securitization to enhance development and 
                                                 
1  Unless otherwise stated, for the purpose of this study East Asia comprises the People’s Republic of China (PRC); Hong Kong, 
China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea (Korea); Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and Viet Nam. 
2  Financial stability is taken, in one sense, as the avoidance or mitigation of financial crises, and in another as the effective 
functioning of the financial system. See Arner (2007). 
3  Financialization refers to the relative influence of financial intermediaries and markets in national and international economies, 
including the scale of financial claims relative to aggregate national output, see Section 4 below.    3
financial stability. If East Asia begins to make fuller use of securitization, its motive may be to 
meet funding or investment needs in the real economy rather than balance sheet arbitrage of 
the kind that peaked elsewhere in 2007.  
 
To the extent that securitized transactions or programs exist in Asia, have they developed to 
their fullest potential? Do special advantages exist to increasing structured finance resources in 
the region, especially if non-commercial interests such as state or transnational organizations 
are involved in their development? For example, could structured finance techniques provide 
new sources of funding for infrastructure capital as in parts of Europe, or as specialist long-term 
lenders that became important in prior phases of growth in Japan and Korea? Last, have 
institutional changes to facilitate or stimulate securitization had any impact on post-crisis risk 
aversion for Asian investors? 
 
This study examines different features of East Asian securitization and identifies possible uses 
in other markets, in part to help identify new funding and investment applications. Its findings 
are based on an appraisal of current and prospective uses of securitized transactions in East 
Asia’s leading economies. The analysis is tied to no national model, and in particular refrains 
from using Anglo-American practice as a benchmark. In the US, emphasis on public housing 
policy and the configuration of banking and securities laws have for many years supported the 
refinancing of household credit and, since the 1970s, encouraged the increasingly prolific sale 
of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and asset-backed securities (ABS).
4 While 
this might be applicable elsewhere, it does not necessarily provide a replicable or optimal model 
for East Asia. 
 
The study also considers the concepts underlying securitization and examines the cost 
attractions and drivers for such issues in Asia. It describes what makes securitization 
practicable, what makes individual transactions successful, and the obstacles that cause them 
to fail or put off investors. It examines the impact of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord (Basel I), and 
assesses the likely effects of the introduction in Asia of its recent major revision (Basel II). By 
classifying credit risk and assigning risk weightings in broad strata, Basel I induced increasingly 
active portfolio management among capital-regulated banking intermediaries and created a 
science among such intermediaries for regulatory capital management with a developing array 
of institutions and financial instruments. Significantly, Basel I thus inadvertently led to the 
proliferation of securitization,
5 which radically altered the costs faced by banks when using 
structured finance to meet risk, return, or liquidity objectives. 
 
The study assesses how certain Asian economies have used securitization for policy purposes, 
why others sanction a range of commercial transactions, and what obstacles hinder similar 
developments elsewhere. Finally, it suggests that multilateral development agencies might 
usefully support further reforms to strengthen property rights and the judicial process, promote 
standards among lenders for data collection and analysis, establish common best practices in 
documentation and risk appraisal among financial intermediaries in tandem with regulatory 
enhancements, and encourage securitization as a refunding mechanism for lending associated 
with public policy. These uses might include infrastructural risks, educational lending, and 
agricultural or community finance. For multilateral bodies to become intermediaries in such 
                                                 
4  A recent analysis of ABS issuance in the US, Europe, and Asia and the Pacific (including Australia; Japan; and Taipei,China) 
appears in Gyntelberg and Remolona (2006), page 67. 
5  Including among banks not formally subject to Basel I precepts, resulting either from regulatory competition between markets, or 
bank lenders being subjected to peer pressure through interbank credit pricing. Such behavior occurred in Asia prior to the 
1997/98 financial crisis, although seldom practiced to appropriate standards.    4
areas may be an original and non-conflicting use of official capital, with identifiable goals in 
poverty reduction and incentives for resource development. 
 
The following section outlines securitized transaction concepts, and then looks at the mechanics 
of structured finance and its uses. Section 2 then assesses securitization activity in Asia, 
including the legal and regulatory issues peculiar to the region. Section 3 examines the 
relationship between transaction use and national and global standards in capital regulation, 
especially under the Basel accords. Section 4 considers Asian securitization trends in the 
context of recent global developments, and looks to possible reforms in global markets 
emerging in the wake of the 2007 credit crisis. Section 5 closes by examining the scope for 
developmental uses of structured finance to which multilateral resources might be directed, 
given current levels of activity in Asia, and the implications of post-2007 global developments for 
the future of securitization. Is it time to reconsider the economic and systemic results of 
securitization, rather than its prolific use since the early 1990s in transactional regulatory 
arbitrage by financial intermediaries? The appendixes include the results of empirical analysis of 
factors associated with the growth of securitization, as well as explanations of common 
transaction structures and appraisals of government’s legal provisions. 
 
 
II.   Evolution 
 
While the modern history of securitized transactions dates only from the late 1970s, the 
underlying concepts have been known for centuries.
6 Monarchs have since medieval times 
raised funds through the forward sale of expected tax receipts or tariffs.
7 In the 17th century, 
Dutch investors were making loans to Caribbean plantation owners secured against the 
proceeds from harvested sugar. In a public policy context, the first US federal refunding 
agencies helped encourage bank lending in the 1930s for certain classes of home purchases as 
a measure of public policy, an objective widely adopted elsewhere.
8 
 
Contemporary securitization transactions have become increasingly standardized, initially in US 
markets, then in other jurisdictions such as Australia and the United Kingdom (UK), and more 
recently in other economies. As securitization has spread through certain banks and housing 
lenders, it has produced enormously complex contractual structures—a factor that may be at 
the core of the disruption that began to affect markets in mid-2007. This evolved in tandem with 
increasingly sophisticated US and international securities markets.
9 
 
Since the 1980s securitization has become a powerful and widely-used tool in both developed 
and emerging markets. It became a valuable tool in parts of East Asia after the 1997/98 
financial crisis as a means to determine the scope of and dispose of credit losses, partly at the 
behest of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a feature of the market-oriented 
                                                 
6  The first use of the term “securitization” is claimed by a Wall Street banker during a 1977 conversation reported in the Wall Street 
Journal (Ranieri 1996). 
7  The sale of offices was a formal institution of the Byzantine Empire by the 11th century, in which form it was characterized by a 
leading economic historian of the period as a form of prudent lending to the state, made necessary by weak public finances. 
Formal mechanisms provided incentives to tax collectors to help overcome this weakness (Andreas Andreades, quoted in Laiou, 
2002, pages 7–8; Swart, 1949, page 99). Andreades argued further that tax farming through the sale of public offices was an 
institution of classical Greek city states, and as such may represent the first developed examples of securitized transactions, see 
Andreades (1933), pages 159–161. 
8  Danish and German covered bond transactions were known in the 18th century and began to resemble modern transferable 
issues in the late 19th century (see Appendix 4). 
9  US Federal legislation was needed before mortgage-backed instruments would be regarded as securities for investment and 
regulatory purposes, and thus held by non-bank investors (see Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984).    5
“Washington consensus.” It soon began to appeal to certain states as a device to help bring 
about market-based reform, effectively using the effects of the financial crisis as a pretext to 
lessen traditional reliance on bank intermediation. Throughout the period, both commercial and 
official interests sought to promote securitization to users, or induced legal or regulatory reforms 
and in some cases provided incentives to users, especially in housing finance.
10 
 
The results are now seen most clearly in the breadth of completed transactions, which have 
included risk in most East Asian jurisdictions and both cross-border deals in major currencies 
and domestic local currency transactions, whether or not available to foreign investors. Yet 
securitization remains largely underutilized by institutional investors in Asia as it is often costly 
to execute, and has yet to deliver wide-ranging results in terms of systemic reforms or 




Securitization represents an important form of credit risk transfer.
11 It may be deployed as an 
established means to obtain funding at an acceptable cost, assist in portfolio risk management, 
or to meet investor preferences.
12 Separately, financial sector laws and regulations, including, 
since the early-1990s, many related to accounting or taxation, have triggered very considerable 
growth in transactions for banks and other financial sector users, largely to the neglect of more 
traditional economic drivers. This study suggests how that emphasis may change in response to 
the performance of structured finance markets in 2007. Where regulations provide incentives for 
financial intermediaries to use securitized structures, the process constitutes transactional 
regulatory arbitrage, whether seen as efficient capital management or taken as evasion or 
avoidance through the circumvention of rules by contractual means. 
 
One core commercial concept of securitization is to separate future cash flows from their 
originator and use those cash flows to generate new funding resources. In addition to pooling 
risk, whole businesses may securitize distinct parts of their commercial activities—for example 
to improve credit ratings by reducing consolidated leverage or to reduce external financing 
costs. The result may be to increase liquidity for certain fixed assets or business streams, with 
broader results in terms of accounting, costs, and credit standing.
13 
 
Securitization can therefore be seen as the antithesis of the modern corporate framework for 
commercial activity. Even the simplest enterprise develops specialized functions to minimize 
transaction costs and achieve economies of scale. Securitization thus seeks to sever 
commercial activity from organizational or locational concerns and place it within a contractual 
setting. It will succeed only if a range of both fundamental and more sophisticated institutions 




                                                 
10  See Section 2. 
11  Credit risk transfer is a means by which credit risk may be acquired or shed to alter the risk-return profile of a portfolio of financial 
claims. It is used by borrowers, intermediaries or end-investors, and may or may not be funded. Buying or selling loans or 
securities is a simple form of funded credit risk transfer; examples of unfunded credit risk transfer include the sale or purchase of 
credit protection through insurance or credit default swaps (CDS). Whole business securitizations represent a transfer of credit 
risk from corporate shareholders.  
12  For a discussion of the advantages and challenges involved in emerging market securitization, see Arner (2002). 
13  The pure commercial interpretation of securitization is exemplified by Schwarcz (2002). Whole business securitizations have 
been completed in Asia only in the non-residential property sector. 
14  Arner (2007) discusses more fully the institutional structures necessary to support simple cash securitization.    6
Securitization also represents a form of financial intermediation outside the confines of lending 
organizations and is thus concerned with ensuring that contracts are completed.
15 Properly 
practiced, it dispenses with the aggregation of claims within any single intermediary and is 
designed to expressly avoid a range of inherent mismatches historically associated with lending 
by these intermediaries.
16 For many financial intermediaries, securitization breaks commercial 
lending into its constituent parts, similar to the way that industrial groups use whole business or 
segmental securitization. 
  
Traditional bank credit intermediation entails three major transformations of duration, credit risk, 
and value, as well as secondary effects prompted by risk management decisions that seek to 
offset those primary mismatches. 
 
First, an intermediary must manage funding and reinvestment risk associated respectively with 
the withdrawal of a deposit prior to repayment of the loan that it helps fund, and the unexpected 
early repayment of a loan for which a deposit of longer duration has been contracted.
17 The 
intermediary can mitigate the risk by charging penalties, or seeking to maintain and match broad 
portfolios of assets and liabilities. Securitization is an alternative means to address the bank’s 
process of duration transformation.
18 However, securitization itself relies upon transformational 
assumptions unless each claim that it generates has an optimal contractual match.
19 
 
Second, the liability compositions of many commercial bank intermediaries will often be far more 
diverse than their loan portfolios, ignoring geographical concentrations of individual or 
commercial depositors subject to shared economic conditions. The result may be that external 
shocks have a disproportionate impact on one side of the intermediary’s balance sheet. 
 
Third, unless an intermediary becomes wholly insolvent, it will expect to repay most deposit 
liabilities at their nominal (par) value but may not always recover the full amount of any single 
loan if a borrower defaults. This transformation is asymmetric, and may be given a definite and 
precise form in general expectations by mandatory deposit insurance schemes. 
 
Securitization represents one solution to these three elemental mismatches. Securitized 
transactions may be designed to maintain such mismatches, for example, to seek profits from 
duration mismatches and yield curve plays, but unlike banks, they need not do so.
20 
Transformations of the kind identified here have been cited as “core characteristics of banking,” 
which together with levels of leverage that typically exceed other commercial sectors make 
                                                 
15  Throughout this study, “institution” means a law, rule or established practice; “intermediaries” are organizations concerned with 
financial transactions, including credit creation and lending. The term “financial institution” is partial, in wrongly suggesting 
stability, trustworthiness, or risk-averse behavior. 
16  See Arner (2007) for a discussion of traditional risks and responses thereto. 
17  Unforeseen unavailability of retail or wholesale deposits is a common catalyst in modern bank distress, including the mid-2007 
liquidity crisis experienced by a British home mortgage lender, Northern Rock plc. 
18  The risk management of duration transformation between assets and liabilities is often mischaracterized as “borrowing short and 
lending long” (Buiter, 2007) but is only one example of such practice. For many years, banks have sought contractually to 
mitigate the risk of the withdrawal of short-term deposits, for example with demand or “call” loans that become payable upon 
notice, or with provisions for compensation for increased interest costs. 
19 By contrast, the 2007 securitization market dislocation is largely associated with the withdrawal of funding from holders of 
securitized risks, see Section 4. 
20  This mechanism makes securitized transactions a solution to the problem of permanent equilibrium credit rationing identified by 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), whereby banks fail to lend to all willing and acceptable borrowers due to incentive factors associated 
with asymmetric information. Hill (1996) argues further that as a source of external funding, securitization reduces the transaction 
cost premium demanded by risk averse lenders when confronted with such problems, the unwanted “lemons” issue described by 
Akerlof (1970), but fails to show that the contractual solution of securitization is complete in welfare terms.    7
banks “susceptible to runs and panics” and “inherently unstable.”
21 Given that these factors are 
also inherent in banking activity rather than responses to the regulation of capital, liquidity or 
disclosure, this is taken as justification to regulate banks.
22 However, it is less clear that this is a 
sufficient explanation, since other solutions can also be used to address such “instability”. 
 
For this reason, the mechanics and enabling institutions of securitization require high reliability 
and integrity. It may be that badly written or unrealistic contracts have impeded growth in Asian 
securitized markets. More broadly, the collapse in investor confidence in 2007 intensified 
concerns as to the contractual completeness of outstanding structured finance deals, especially 
in the subprime segment of US and UK RMBS issues. 
 
The analysis in Appendix 1 suggests that securitization use varies as economies develop and 
financial markets become more sophisticated. Not all advanced economies are prolific users of 
structured transactions. However, it would be uncharacteristic for economies with effective and 
efficient financial systems not to support securitization. At the same time, later sections will 





“Cash” securitization is the irrevocable transfer of defined financial assets by their originator, 
funded by the simultaneous sale to third-party investors of new securities issued by the asset 
buyer. Neither asset buyer nor investor has transactional recourse to the originator. Other 
continuing aspects of the lending process will also be replaced by an array of contracts with 
administrative agents. 
 
By contrast, “synthetic” securitization involves simple or complex forms of collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs) that wholly or partly replicate the credit risk transfer involved in cash 
transactions, but with no outright funded transfer of claims. The generic structures of each 
transaction are described more fully in Appendix 2. 
 
Covered bonds share some features of securitization, and can accomplish certain—but not all—
of its objectives. The transaction model is explained in Appendix 3. Such structures have long 
been used in Denmark and Germany, and have grown increasingly popular elsewhere in 
Europe since the mid-1990s. Conventional covered bonds create a security interest for 
investors in claims held by an intermediary. Thus covered bondholders obtain preferential rights 
over pools of claims that remain funded assets on the balance sheet of the originating 
intermediary or its subsidiary. Those assets are said to “cover” the investor’s claim as dedicated 
collateral without an irrevocable transfer. Covered bonds have traditionally been issued primarily 
for funding reasons, but are also seen in locational and transactional regulatory arbitrage, for 




“Structured” covered bonds are a variant on the generic form that represents a contractual 
solution for issuers domiciled in jurisdictions lacking enabling covered bond legislation. These 
                                                 
21  Macey (2006), page 4. 
22  Ibid., page 4–7. The proposition is more convincing if it assumes that bank instability induces financial sector contagion, see 
Kaufman (1994). See Arner (2007) for a fuller analysis of mechanisms to address systemic instability. 
23  German public sector lenders commonly use offshore vehicles as covered bond issuers.    8
bonds offer a relatively lower net return to investors sensitive to risk-asset weightings and thus 
raise the issuer’s costs. 
 
Conventional covered bonds generally involve less intensive structuring or credit enhancement 
compared with securitized issues. This often will lead to funding cost advantages for the user. 
The covered bondholder has recourse to the originator, and designated pool assets “cover” the 
new transaction as collateral, without an irrevocable transfer to an independent third party. 
Covered bonds have historically required national enabling laws, not only because of general 
civil law practice (the structure is more commonly used in civil law jurisdictions), but (in Europe 
where the preponderance of transactions have occurred to date) due to European Union 
investment and banking directives and their impact on investor preferences. 
 
C. Transaction  Mechanics 
 
Most modern securitized transactions use pooled assets or income to create securities with 
combinations of credit ratings, yield and duration that are acceptable to different classes of 
investor. This has advantages for the originator in that it may allow for the sale of less-viable 
risk—for example with severely impaired assets or risk subject to legal or other contingencies. 
However, the feasibility of any highly complex transaction depends on a pronounced bias in the 
use of pool proceeds to service the highest ranking claims, requiring lower priority tranches to 
be deeply subordinated and thus acceptable to only the most risk-preferring investor, if any. 
 
In stressed conditions these tranches are likely to remain unsold or retained as claims by the 
pool originator. Regulators may be concerned that, as a result, the originator holds a poorer 
overall risk portfolio than prior to the execution of the transaction. Investment conduits and 
structured investment vehicles (SIV) have become common if complex solutions to the 
regulatory and accounting problems associated with placing these lowest ranking “equity” 
tranches.
24 Basel II introduces a penal capital treatment of such claims when retained by 
originators. 
 
With conventional cash securitization, the asset buyer is a special purpose vehicle (SPV) in the 
form of a single purpose company or trust, depending on legal practice in the jurisdiction of the 
domicile of the assets. Securities are typically issued in tiers or tranches, known as payment 
“waterfalls,” that carry different commercial terms and risks so as to extract the maximum value 
from the pool assets over time. 
 
All but the simplest transactions employ internal and external credit enhancement to improve or 
stabilize the risk of any tranche. Internal enhancement usually takes the form of portfolio pool 
design, over-collateralization or the creation of a liquidity reserve. Cash collateral or third-party 
insurance policies or financial guarantees are common external supporting sources of value. 
Such guarantees (or “wraps”) are provided by specialist “monoline” insurers, which first 
                                                 
24  For solutions that may fall into partial disuse following the 2007 market disruptions, see Section 4 below. Conduits and SIVs are 
similar forms of investment funds, usually managed or sponsored by banks that have been prolific investors in structured 
securities. First used in London in the 1980s by Citibank N.A., they are organized in favorable tax domiciles and aim to profit 
through leveraged investment or proactive asset liability management. Banks have used these vehicles to avoid consolidating 
risk assets or to lessen their overall need for regulatory capital. The main difference between conduits and SIVs is the extent of 
credit support provided by the sponsoring bank. Conduits are funded by issuing short-term asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP) and require contingent credit lines for the full amount of their liabilities. SIVs tend to be only modestly supported with 
such credit lines.    9
emerged in the early 1970s in the US municipal bond market and have since become a 





The most important aspect of cash and synthetic securitized transaction formation arises from 
tranching—payment priorities established to create separate securities issues with distinct risk-
return features. This seeks to set payment rules that generate an optimal use of both investor 
demand and the time value of an asset pool. Even comparatively simple transactions require 
extensive modeling of pool performance, which demands adequate data, an understanding of 
the national payment and default experience of sectoral risks of the same type as the pool, and 
resources to forecast and stress-test as complete a set of outcomes as feasible. Synthetic 
transactions involve modeling that is identical in concept but still more complex. In all cases, this 




Investor preferences provide the starting objective in pricing and structuring, with originators and 
transaction arrangers seeking to extract the greatest value from the resources available. Such 
manipulation is central to all securitized issues and partly explains their relative complexity and 
expense. Structuring the transactions has come to require active participation by credit rating 
agencies, which model the waterfall treatment of payments under many sets of conditions, and 
set terms for individual tranches to be given target credit ratings. This level of involvement is 
markedly different from commercial rating agencies’ practices with non-structured corporate or 
state bonds issues and is increasingly questioned as a conflict of interest.
27 
 
Tranching also explains the potential for securitization to assist in general financial market 
transparency and development. This is most apparent in the use of securitization to assist in the 
recycling of nonperforming loans (NPLs), where a market-determined yield acceptable to the 
ultimate investor provides a transparent mechanism to value a pool of impaired assets where 
none otherwise existed. 
 
Both legal and empirical analyses have seen tranching as a means to extract advantage from 
segmenting investors. Institutional analysis would see tranching as creating payment priorities 
that in turn allow a high investment-grade credit rating to be given to as large as possible a 
portion of any single transaction. The strict contractual priority established by a payment 
waterfall seeks to eliminate the chance that a creditor of either the pool or the pool originator 
would challenge payments to a holder of notes. It also serves to avoid payment delays in the 
event of bankruptcy or receivership. 
 
                                                 
25  Monoline insurers provide only financial guarantees but most are associated with general insurers or substantial conglomerates. 
Asian Securitization and Infrastructure Assurance Pte Limited (ASIA Limited) was an Asian regionally-oriented monoline insurer 
established in 1996 by ADB and certain commercial interests, later becoming dormant due to losses incurred in the Asian 
financial crisis, see Lejot, Arner, and Pretorius (2006), page 284–285. 
26  The limitations of this involvement were cautiously voiced by the BIS Committee on the Global Financial System (2005), which 
noted at page 11 that  
Tranching creates a layer of analytical complexity beyond that of estimating the loss distribution of the collateral 
pool. It requires detailed, deal-specific documentation […] to ensure that the intended characteristics […] are 
actually delivered under all plausible scenarios. This implies intense transactional interaction between arranger 
and rating agency that has now become controversial, see Section 4. 
27  Such a conflict is disputed by rating agencies, see for example Bell and Rose (2007), but now widely believed to be a concern, 
especially in the context of the quasi-regulatory function accorded to rating agencies under Basel II, see Prada (2007), and 
Section 4 below.    10
Experience suggests that tranching takes advantage of investors’ varying risk-return 
preferences, relying also upon the need of almost all institutional investors in structured 
transactions for their holdings to be given credit ratings.
28 Tranching helps meet the minimum 
criteria of the rating agencies, and hence minimizes the value of payments to be delivered to 
investors at a particular credit rating level in relation to the predicted present value of the total 
pool. This appears inconsistent with both traditional theories of bank intermediation, and the 
suggestion that securitization represents a Coasian solution
29 to the mismatches inherent in 




Securitization use is widespread both geographically and by industry risk classification, but not 
ubiquitous outside of most developed financial markets. Its commercial and financial benefits (in 
addition to the potential stability benefits discussed above) become manifest in one or more of 
five ways: 
  
(i)  A means to make unacceptable risks satisfactory to an investor, assuming that 
each potential investor has known risk-return objectives. 
(ii)  Providing a credit rating higher than its respective sovereign ceiling or that of the 
originator. This may be especially attractive in the context of infrastructure 
financing. 
(iii)  The means to price pools of assets that are difficult to value, usually to make 
their sale feasible. This applies particularly to NPLs and other impaired financial 
claims. 
(iv)  A method to create capital market funding where none previously existed. 
(v)  For asset originators, a funding source where none was available at an 
acceptable cost, especially when lending becomes subject to quantitative 
regulatory constraints. 
 
These applications all represent tools to assist in balance sheet management. For modern 
financial sector users, securitization has become most crucially a mechanism for credit risk 
transfer and regulatory capital management, as Section 4 of this study shows. Credit risk 
transfer needs to be assessed in both the sense of allowing users to manage asset or liability 
portfolios, and more generally as claims move into and out of the regulated banking sector and 
across borders.
30 It may achieve other objectives for certain users or in particular phases of 
interest rate or credit cycles, and may have developmental or incentive features for both 
originators and investors or for general economic welfare. 
 
Thus it is now common for regulators to consider the consequences of enhanced risk transfer 
for the dispersal of risk within and between domestic financial systems. This has several 
dimensions, some of which may be beneficial for efficiency and financial stability, such as 
lessening concentrations of geographical or sectoral risk, and includes transfers of credit risk to 
                                                 
28  Firla-Cuchra and Jenkinson (2005), who “also find some support for more nuanced modeling predictions such as the positive 
impact of the average quality of assets on tranching”, ibid, page 32. 
29  Coasian theory, associated with economist Ronald Coase, describes the efficiency of an economic allocation or outcome in the 
presence of externalities. If trade in an externality is feasible and there are no transaction costs, then bargaining will lead to an 
efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of property rights. 
30  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005) and Section 4 below.    11
lightly-regulated nonbank intermediaries or non-capital-regulated end investors. The increasing 
velocity of risk transfer over the past decade presents first order information problems when 
bank transferors are poorly regulated or their compliance standards are uncertain. This was 
clear in the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis and in the 2007 subprime credit crisis, especially 
where nonbank intermediaries were active in corporate lending and consumer credit creation. 
  
Furthermore, securitization may enable funding or refinancing by financial intermediaries, often 
through official housing finance agencies. This may include the entry of new commercial parties 
into established financing sectors such as residential mortgage finance or consumer credit, with 
consequences for overall efficiency and use of capital.
31 
 
Securitization can be applied to all defined credit risks, including delinquent assets or claims, 
but even in sophisticated markets is for reasons of cost and transaction expense typically 
associated with risks involving similar, unconnected, predictable cash flows. Assets commonly 
used in cash securitization include residential or commercial mortgage loans, credit and credit 
card receivables, vehicle or fleet loans, certain cash receivables, air ticket sales, taxes on 
revenue, transport or other tolls, licensing fees, foreign worker remittances, and music royalties. 
Almost all of these risks have been used in transactions in East Asia during the last decade. 
Dissimilar claims have been successfully securitized in certain highly developed markets, 
usually using synthetic structures,
32 but there are examples in the Japan, UK, US, and 




The technique has been applied in advanced economies to whole businesses, discrete 
business streams, and more widely to single large-scale commercial properties. Commercial 
property transactions may become a potential source of new transactions in East Asia due to 
the importance of the sector in bank lending, especially if single- or multiple-asset real estate 
investment trusts (REITs) grow more popular.
34 East Asian REITs and their supporting 
legislation or regulatory codes tend to favor securitization structures to a greater extent than in 
the US, where REITs first appeared. The use of pooled NPLs is also comparatively new, notably 
in Germany and other major civil law jurisdictions. 
 
In all cases, securitization represents a complex means to achieve the simple objective of 
making available well-defined risks to single homogeneous classes of investors. As such, the 
                                                 
31  To a greater degree than in East Asia, the introduction of ABS and RMBS in the US arose from banking and securities laws that 
gave an incentive to investment banks to create and securitize risks historically funded by commercial banks. See also Warnock 
and Warnock (2007). 
32  Based upon basket or index credit default swaps. 
33  A 1996 collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction for UK-based NatWest Bank was the first significant public issue based 
on sizeable corporate bank loans, see International Financing Review (1996a, 1996b), where a new SPV participated in receipts 
from $5 billion of the bank’s loans and credit commitments, all to maximize its efficient use of regulatory capital. This structure 
has been superseded by CLOs involving outright sales of claims, and by synthetic and actively-managed CLOs. Regulatory 
changes continue to alter the cost parameters of transactions with similar aims, but it is notable that no similar issue has been 
made by lenders in Asia outside Japan. A small number of securitizations of lease receivables and bank loans to small and 
medium-scale enterprises (SME) have been completed for banks in Japan, and since 2005 in single deals in Malaysia; 
Singapore; and Taipei,China, apparently with official encouragement. These are uncommon due to technical challenges and 
competing bank sector liquidity, but as refunding sources are similar to transactions intended to support microfinance and 
agricultural credit, see Section 5. 
34  REITs are collective investment schemes that became attractive funding tools for property developers in Japan; Singapore; and 
Hong Kong, China (in declining scale of use) during phases of weak property prices. They also exist on a modest scale in Korea, 
Malaysia, and Thailand. To originators, REITs can resemble formal whole business securitizations, although more loosely framed 
“captive” REITs allow originators to participate in gains derived from trust assets. Singapore’s Business Trusts Act 2004 permits 
similar schemes involving most forms of non-property risks. Both Singapore and Hong Kong, China now allow REITs to own 
foreign assets.    12
technique has been known to be overly complex, manifested in high marginal transaction 
expenses and development periods for single “one-off” transactions that can be protracted, 
especially when the prevailing law hinders rather than helps.
35 These obstacles have yet to be 
efficiently removed or circumvented in East Asia. More generally, securitization expenses are 
typically high, even if marginal transacting costs are reduced as a result of deal frequency, or 
supportive legislative or regulatory change. This can be seen clearly in expenses associated 
with data collection and verification, deal development, modeling, rating agency negotiation, 
marketing, and contractual execution. 
 
 
III.  Development in East Asia 
 
Commercial interests have long argued that structured finance has considerable potential in 
Asian finance, and its use has been accepted as having been a valuable strategic tool in the 
restructuring of financial sector claims in Korea after 2000. Yet the region’s modest overall use 
of securitization prompts the question as to whether this aspect of financial development lags 
other regions as a function of time, national institutional conditions, or as the result of certain 
economic conditions such as national savings and investment imbalances or relatively high 
private sector liquidity. Conservative levels of bank leverage have limited the supply of loans for 
cash securitization even in Japan—where markets in structured securities have developed 
successfully. 
 
In the sense often associated with structured finance in East Asia, the favorable view of its 
being encouraged for development is typified by Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
analysis: 
 
Structured finance can have a positive influence on the financial system because 
it can transform ordinarily illiquid or risky assets into more liquid or less risky 
ones. It thus offers an alternative source of long-term funding in both domestic 
and cross-border markets, and can foster the development of domestic bond 
markets. In turn, this could promote greater bank and financial market efficiency, 
as it implies greater competition to meet customer financing needs.
36 
 
While acknowledging that proponents of securitization need to be cautioned as to its risks,
37 it is 
notable that a review published in mid-2007 during the global structured finance markets’ most 




Securitization activity increased markedly in parts of Asia after 2000—notably in Hong Kong, 
China; Japan; Korea; and Malaysia—in each case with housing loans used as raw material, and 
in Singapore through transactions supported by commercial property. Critically, securitization 
became a strikingly valuable tool for Korea as part of extensive corporate and financial sector 
post-crisis restructuring, when new legislation allowed large volumes of NPLs and other 
impaired financial claims to be employed as collateral for new CDOs, a process of recycling 
                                                 
35  Early cash and synthetic CLOs took many months to prepare and execute, despite originating in sophisticated jurisdictions. 
36  Scatigna and Tover (2007), page 71, emphasis added. 
37  Id., pages 81–82. 
38  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005).    13
defaulted claims instrumental in the recuperation of the wider Korean economy.
39 At the same 
time, completed securitization volumes in the PRC, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand remain 
very limited. Securitization may be undeveloped or poorly used in East Asia partly because 
factional interests favor the existing financial system, with its emphasis on bank credit creation 
intended to serve relatively closely-held corporate sectors. This long-standing feature of the 
region has been taken both as conducive to economic growth and more recently as 
symptomatic of “cronyism”, poor commercial sector governance, and a factor that helped induce 
and intensify the 1997/98 financial crisis.
40 
 
It should be noted that the study examines structured issuance involving East Asian risks, 
whether in domestic markets or elsewhere, and takes no direct account of the inclination of East 
Asian intermediaries or sources of portfolio investment to acquire or trade in non-Asian 
securitized risks.
41 Such capital flows from East Asian sources have often been considerable 
since 2000. Market-based financial intermediation may induce banks to buy or hold securitized 
assets, and portfolio investment by Asian domiciled banks and other intermediaries as well as 
sovereign investors in non-Asian risks has been a substantial private counterpart to the 
accumulation of international reserves in the recovery from the 1997/98 financial crisis. This 
may represent a deliberate portfolio risk adjustment by such banks and investors, as well as a 
response to weak local credit demand. 
 
A. Securitization  Drivers 
 
Structured transactions first appeared in East Asia in the late 1980s, with banks replicating 
simple private contractual models developed elsewhere. They gained momentum in certain 
national markets upon official acceptance,
42 and by 1997 were widely used, if not prolifically. 
Most deals were negotiated as single transactions until the crisis brought forward a second 
generation of issues, with large programmed volumes of Korean impaired risks pooled under 
CBO structures. The crisis aftermath encouraged several economies to adopt securitization as a 
part of recovery strategy, but only Korea made the fullest use of its scope in recovery and 
market reform. This is most often attributed to cultural reasons, but institutional factors are also 
present. 
 
Thus, over a 20-year period, the region’s motives for the use of structured fundraisings have 
altered, from single deals and commercial promotion, to a feature of broader post-crisis financial 
policy. Since 2000, capital market reforms have won growing official sympathy in the region, 
leading to certain changes in laws, but activity appears constrained,




                                                 
39  By contrast, Crotty, and Lee (2005) typify those hostile to these reforms, claiming that Korea’s “conversion from a state-guided, 
bank-based to a globally open capital financial system” (page 338) led to damaging falling rates of capital accumulation, and was 
contrary to the interests of a majority of Koreans. 
40  Bank credit creation was pivotal in the developmental state model used to characterize Japan and Korea in the 1950s and 1960s, 
respectively, see Johnson (1982) and Liu, Lejot and Arner (2008). 
41  There may be local technical value in such activity, for example, with banks in Singapore (Burton, 2007) and elsewhere (Tucker, 
2007). 
42 Notably  Malaysia. 
43  Issuance has been negligible in Indonesia and the Philippines. In Korea, securitization of housing loans is modest despite the 
creation in 2003–04 of the state-controlled Korea Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC) to support the refinancing of bank 
housing loans, see Chensavasdijai et al (2007), pages 47–53 and see Footnote 144 below. 
44  Issuance of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) based on residential property in Hong Kong, China and both commercial and 
residential property in Japan are examples not wholly related to the market dislocation of 2007. In each case, issuance has been 
limited by shortages of poolable loans relative to available capital.    14
One institutional explanation is that sectoral interests may favor the existing configuration of 
Asia’s financial systems. Thus governments, financial intermediaries, and transaction arrangers 
may all derive economic rents from segmented or illiquid securities markets.
45 Asia’s 
governments have often seen the banking sector’s dominance as assisting the management of 
monetary or exchange rate policy or the deployment of consumer savings, and for many the 
creation of freely functioning securities markets is both desirable as a mark of sophistication and 
a threat to fiat control of monetary or credit policy. The negative connotations of this emphasis 
became clear only during the 1997/98 financial crisis. 
 
The pre-1997 transaction focus gave way to a clearer imperative to securitization after the 
financial crisis, with Korea becoming the first to institute legislative reforms and the most prolific 
host of activity. More recently, the precautionary incentives to instigate institutional reform to 
permit securitization have subsided due to lapse of time, a resurgence of economic growth, and 
in particular the results of reserve accumulation and comparatively high private sector liquidity. 
These factors have made reforms less urgent than seemed essential at the turn of the 
millennium. The PRC’s lack of alacrity in introducing long-term securitization legislation is the 
most significant example,
46 but the pattern is observed in Indonesia, Thailand, and elsewhere. 
In other jurisdictions, the result has been adequate primary legislation but a lack of subsequent 
regulatory guidance or completeness, and minimal usage. 
 
Since the early 1990s, the driving forces for securitization have changed, especially in East 
Asia’s less sophisticated markets. The shift in emphasis in global drivers shows that traditional 
commercial motives for borrowers to use securitization as an elective part of funding strategy 
are supplanted by regulatory motives, largely prompted by bank capital regulation (Figure 1). 
 
 





Increasingly, uniform regulation of bank capital from the late 1980s came to influence the 
nature, composition, and funding of all lending activity. This produced a new objective for 
structured finance and led to a material expansion in the application of securitization by banks 
and other regulated intermediaries. Thus the incentive to securitize shifted from commercial 
motives to one with roots in transactional or systemic regulatory arbitrage. Rapid growth in 
issuance in the major developed financial sectors after the early 1990s is largely attributable to 
the consequences of harmonized capital regulation, including the creation of regulatory capital 
                                                 
45  Especially since financial market innovation is largely unprotected by copyright. 
 
46 The PRC has instead sanctioned trial transactions prior to introducing permanent legislation, most recently sizeable local 
currency domestic ABS and CLO issues for Shanghai Pudong Development Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, respectively, in September and October 2007.    15
and the assumption of weightings for bank risk assets, and the implementation of exposure 
limits on sectoral and single obligors.
47 After 2000, this practice accelerated in many developed 
markets, so that 2007 marked a chronic overreaction to perceived and actual excesses, 
especially those originated in 2005–06. 
 
By contrast, in East Asia, with a shorter securitization history, a more complex pattern has 
involved both regulatory and other influences, especially after the 1997/98 crisis (Figure 2). 
 
 




Prior to the crisis, securitization in East Asia resulted from commercial interests seeking to 
replicate deals used in more established markets, in many cases using domestic assets in 
offshore transactions for sale to yield-seeking non-Asian investors, rather than as part of 
domestic financial reform. It became possible to complete transactions in most jurisdictions 
using complex contractual techniques to avoid obstacles of law or regulation. The resulting deal 
volumes were inevitably modest. 
 
B. Post-crisis  Reforms 
 
The 1997/98 crisis provided an incentive for certain jurisdictions to adopt securitization to assist 
with the recycling of NPLs, and in some cases was so strong an imperative that new issuance 
was unprecedented.
48 The incentive to introduce market- oriented reforms included IMF 
encouragement, but among the crisis-affected ASEAN countries the overall results were mixed: 
Malaysia avoided Washington consensus practice by increasing controls on cross-border 
investment but continued to promote securitization in its domestic markets; Indonesia and 
Thailand allowed relatively unrestricted capital flows but were slow in introducing legal reforms 
to facilitate securitized deals. 
 
A more widespread post-crisis trend was the wave of new publicly-capitalized agencies or asset 
management companies (AMC). These acquired impaired assets from public and private sector 
financial intermediaries—in most cases at steep discounts to their nominal value—and handled 
their subsequent resolution, whether liquidation, further sale, or recovery. The importance of this 
development is comparable to that of the US Resolution Trust Corporation from 1989 to 1995, 
especially in terms of the effect on market confidence and initial impact of certain Asian AMCs. 
The most notable were the Korean Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO), Danamodal 
                                                 
47  BIS analysts describe the expansion in global issuance as “remarkable,” Gyntelberg and Remolona (2006), page 67, but more 
striking is that growth in the market was unintended on the part of the Basel Committee architects. 
48  See Appendix 4 for an outline of recent enabling legislation and regulation. Australia, Japan, and Korea have accounted for 
around two-thirds of annual regional ABS issuance (Gyntelberg and Remolona 2006).    16
Nasional Bhd in Malaysia, and four PRC AMCs that acquired defaulted loans from the largest 
state-owned banks. 
 
The intention in each case was to derive a clearing price from an assessment of the risk-return 
objectives of potential investors in securitized issues for the removal of assets from the stricken 
originator’s balance sheet. With this premise, iterative models of the kind used by credit rating 
agencies of the behavior and value under different conditions of most asset pools can generate 
a price indication for the initiating asset sale more openly and less controversially than private 
sales negotiated between AMCs and privileged investors. This may not be a solution to all forms 
of financial distress, but has qualities identified as valuable in a developmental sense, most 
clearly seen in post-crisis Korea. The process has been widely regarded as successful, but the 
completeness of what is involved is not always acknowledged. Thus in the case of the PRC and 
Indonesia, sales of NPLs to third party investors were largely conducted under circumstances 
that precluded securitization, with its underlying need for transparency. 
   
The PRC’s AMCs are sizeable undertakings but a lack of timely legal support prevented their 
becoming more than token securitization users.
49 This may change when legal reforms are 
completed in 2008–09 to introduce a permanent national framework for securitization. Until now, 
AMC funding has been opaque and transaction activity has mainly involved the auction of 
impaired loans. When compared with the urgency of post- crisis objectives in fostering large-
scale securitization in Korea, time has dissipated the PRC’s imperative to instigate NPL 
recycling through structured finance techniques, aided by growth of international reserves and 
state bank capital.
50 If new securitization legislation is to produce substantial transaction 




The post-crisis imperative for balance sheet repair made transaction expenses more tolerable, 
resulting in a notable shift in assets, some growth in synthetic transactions, and improved bank 
and corporate balance sheets in certain countries, notably Korea and Malaysia. The gravity of 
the crisis perversely eased cost constraints by making asset sales and the creation of asset-
backed securities essential to bank balance sheet renovation and corporate restructuring. 
 
Those conditions encouraged the belief in official and academic circles that the crisis-driven 
necessity for several jurisdictions to allow securitization could have a broader impact on 
financial market development.
52 In particular, it was argued within ASEAN, ASEAN+3, and 
APEC that depth in securitization to deal with a pressing problem would lead to more effective 
debt markets and gradually help the region guard against other unexpected shocks. Asia’s rapid 
post-crisis recovery and the precautionary accumulation of unprecedented levels of international 
reserves gradually removed the urgency from this argument. 
 
Furthermore, as the recovery progressed and led to improvements in credit ratings, the desire 
among established monoline insurers to provide wraps for feasible East Asian transactions has 
increased, so that credit enhancement is not generally a regional resource constraint. The 
availability of credit enhancement has also been encouraged by yield-seeking investors during a 
prolonged period of relatively low nominal interest rates, but there are indications that such 
                                                 
49  Ma and Fung (2002). See also Hsu, Arner and Wan (2007). 
50  As the scale of such resources obviates the urgency of reform. 
51 One spur may be the propensity of consumer demand for new forms of investments to accelerate with general growth 
(FinanceAsia, 2007). 
52  See for example, Lejot, Arner, and Pretorius (2006), page 271.    17
freely available investor demand may have severely diminished or even vanished with the 
market dislocations of 2007. Until recently, low securitization activity relative to other markets 
and to bank credit creation may have reflected an actual or artificial shortage of poolable assets, 
costly institutional impediments, or a lack of derivative instruments to allow the synthetic 
replication of such risks. 
 
For securitization based on non-distressed assets, housing loans have tended to provide the 
most consistent source material, in part due to official support.
53 Thus housing finance was 
made part of public policy in Japan in 1950 (following the US model); in Malaysia in 1985; Hong 
Kong, China from 1997; and by Korea in 2004.
54 Thailand’s state Government Housing Bank is 
a substantial mortgage lender and has long planned an inaugural securitized issue.
55 This trend 
reflects two motives. First, the ultimate funding cost provided by securitized corporate debt 
compares unfavorably with bank lending, especially in a period of capital accumulation among 
many Asian banks. Second, adequate pool data for mortgages and consumer credit has been 
more often available than for heterogeneous corporate loans. As a result, securitization has 
focused more on liquidity and funding enhancement than the reallocation of credit risk by 
lenders.
56 Except for residential mortgage-based deals in Malaysia and Hong Kong, China, the 
results have yet to be tested in a complete credit cycle. This is important in part due to a lack of 
credit derivative protection through single-name or index Asian credit default swaps (CDS), 
even for Japan, and is also a constraint to ABS growth based on corporate risk.
57 
 
Thus, securitization in Asia evolved from simple profit-seeking to debt recycling in the periods 
straddling the 1997/98 crisis. Future Asian securitization may need broader applications to 
succeed in facilitating the release of capital or assisting in public policy. For securitization to be 
more widely used in East Asia in a new phase of development, both state and commercial 
objectives may need to evolve further, especially after the 2007 global market dislocation. For 
example, if securitization is to support financial development in the region, in part by bridging 
gaps between prevailing credit quality and investor risk preferences, its use will need to differ 
from the highly complex, regulatory-orientated form that seems likely to be disfavored for some 
time in established markets, and to which bank regulators are likely to react. However, altering 
the reliance on bank- based financial systems would have consequences in terms of control and 







                                                 
53  See Gyntelberg and Remolona (2006), page 65. 
54  Chan, Davies and Gyntelberg (2006), pages 71–83, in a study of Hong Kong, China; India; Japan; Korea; and Malaysia. State-
supported finance for home purchase is well-developed in Singapore, but integrated with a mandatory provident fund and entails 
no wholesale market funding or refinancing. The authors believe that specialist state-sponsored agencies promoting housing 
finance have “helped eliminate barriers to securitization” ibid., page 71. 
55  International Financing Review (2006), reporting remarks by the bank’s chairman. No issue is likely before the resolution of the 
current constitutional hiatus and market disruption. 
56  Id. 
57  Note also that Securitization that uses lower-rated corporate paper as collateral […] only work if there are also investors who 
are willing to hold […] the equity tranche which absorbs the first losses. See Gyntelberg and Remolona (2006), page 72. The 
authors indicate that deeply subordinated equity tranches accounted for up to 30% of nominal issuance in KAMCO NPL 
securitizations, and that KAMCO retained much of those risks in most NPL securitizations. Id. at 73; see Fung, George, Hohl, 
and Ma (2004). While there is no doubt that KAMCO was a creation of public policy, the extent of state support for the credit risk 
transfer that it was able to engineer may be less widely understood.    18
C.  Legal and Regulatory Issues 
 
Securitization places emphasis on intensive contracting as great as in any form of financing, 
which is broadly confirmed by the empirical findings of this study reported in Appendix 1. It 
requires a transparent legal framework, clear accounting principles, and regulatory support, 
although the same quality of conditions will also provide incentives for transactional regulatory 
arbitrage. Its success therefore depends upon how its governing system of law accommodates 




The accepted essence of a supportive legal and regulatory framework is to ensure that neither 
law nor regulation lessens the structural integrity of legitimate securitized transactions, and that 
any transfer of assets is permanent and cannot be disturbed by external events, including 
subsequent actions by creditors of the originator. In the market for financial claims, 
securitization is a contractual alternative to intermediation managed within a financial 
organization, most commonly a bank or quasi-bank. It demands establishing contracts that are 
either simple (giving flexibility in operation and decision making, especially in relation to ex post 
events), from which arise agency concerns as with traditional loan contracts, or (more 
commonly) complex arrangements among many parties.
59 It should be noted that market-based 
nonbank financial intermediation in no way implies that banks do not engage in securitization as 
investors or traders. 
 
Details of cash transactions may vary among jurisdictions. But as the description in Appendix 2 
shows, they are assumed to entail the irrevocable transfer of assets to an insubstantive SPV to 
which the asset seller has no ties of ownership or control. Funding for the asset transfer is 
provided by the sale of securities to third-party investors. The transaction must withstand legal 
claims in bankruptcy against the asset seller. Its economics must withstand taxes and duties on 
transfer and in most cases securities issued by the transaction SPV must provide for the 
dependable subordination of claims. 
 
Jurisdictions where securitization is well established, notably Hong Kong, China; Korea; and 
Malaysia, are not necessarily alike in needs or objectives, and except in the common law 
jurisdictions of Hong Kong, China; Malaysia; and Singapore, offshore transactions have usually 
been used to circumvent institutional weakness or obstacles in law or regulation.
60 One way to 
consider Asian securitization is to look at three groups of jurisdictions: those that in principle 
freely allow cash transactions, that is, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore, those for 
which offshore cash transactions have been completed in significant volume, and those with 
obstacles to almost all deals. In all the review markets except Hong Kong, China, new 
domestic or offshore issues are subject to discretionary regulatory approval but this is in no 
                                                 
58  Modern common law systems regard the commercial contract as the result of economic bargaining, the primary aim of which is to 
bestow identified rights, the erosion of which may entail a penalty. Civil law jurisdictions have tended to view contracts as bundles 
of mutual obligations, which are thus intrinsically restricted and for which the courts are generally willing to require performance. 
The effect on lending contracts under civil law systems is generally to limit the potential for their unqualified sale, especially when 
the transferee is insubstantial. The same approach also tends to complicate the possible sale of future payment rights. 
59  Amplified by Scott (2006). The transaction cost decision is summarized by Schwartz and Watson (2004), page 26,  
When parties choose [contractual] forms that themselves ensure efficient investment and trade (such as a 
complete mechanism), they strongly prefer that these contracts not be renegotiated. Initial contracting costs 
can be high in relation to contractual gains, however, and then parties choose more simple contractual forms 
that require. 
60  Malaysia is a prominent center for Islamic finance. Securitized sukuk transactions have been sanctioned by Malaysia’s Islamic 
Financial Services Board since 2005 (Jobst, 2007). This represents forms of contractual and market segmentation that have 
value for participants but which creates transactions that are economically indistinct from the generic “conventional’ structures 
considered here.    19
sense an obstacle unique to structured transactions. 
 
At the same time, it must be recognized that encouraging the transfer of credit risk to nonbank 
financial intermediaries may have unwanted secondary results, given that lightly-regulated 
intermediaries were a cause of loan losses and contagion in 1997/98 in East Asia—and 
globally in 2007. This suggests a dual strategy to promote the compliance and regulatory 
quality aspects of Basel II,
61 while supporting the removal of national obstacles to securitization 
and regional investment in securitized instruments, especially to the extent that such a step 
would have broader benefits in terms of economic growth, financial stability, and poverty 
reduction. 
 
The table in Appendix 5 shows that in general, the elements of law typically associated with 
securitized transactions in advanced markets are present in the three cited common law review 
jurisdictions, especially those affecting existing or future claims originated by financial 
intermediaries. However, certain future claims that cannot be specified in ways expected by 
current law may be seen as hazardous source material by investors or third-party monoline 
insurers. This has often been found with credit card receivables. In some cases insolvency 
laws have caused uncertainty as to the integrity of securitized transactions using cash 
receivables. This is not a problem at present for transaction originators given the investment 
grade credit ratings of Hong Kong, China; Malaysia; and Singapore. 
 
Where enacted, modern securitization legislation in civil law jurisdictions usually allows for the 
creation of SPVs or trusts, which would otherwise generally not be permitted under the 
provisions of national civil codes. Certain jurisdictions are affected by related issues of law, 
tax or financial market rules, rather than pure securitization provisions. This adds to contractual 
uncertainty and applies in the Philippines, for example. Securitization transactions also require 
accepted commercial precepts that are not matters of legal policy, including, for example, a 
lack of contractual restrictions to the transfer of financial claims. These exist throughout the 
review markets except generally for Singapore and Hong Kong, China. 
 
Transactional integrity with covered bond issues has a similar character, but demands that 
bondholders retain a contractual priority relative to other creditors of the originator. By custom 
and national regulation, covered transactions always require a clear framework of law. This is 
currently reinforced by investor demand for covered bonds being predominantly in continental 
Europe, and the desire of issuers to meet European Union (EU) rules allowing favorable 
capital treatment for regulated investors. National enabling laws differ in detail and lead to 
differences in governing transaction structures between jurisdictions, especially in relation to 
the banking and administrative functions required within the covered bond issuer. 
 
Thus in the legal model used in France, the grantor of security interests is required to endow the 
target SPV with the resources to administer or procure administration for the relevant pool as if 
the grantor itself did not exist. Thus the originating intermediary, which may be involved in a 
broad range of credit-related activities, effectively creates a second generation intermediary 
whose lending is confined to a narrow spectrum of credit risks, and which becomes the covered 
bond issuer. New covered bond markets have become quickly established in parts of Europe 
since the late 1990s but the utility of the covered bond model to East Asia would depend partly 
on the administrative and servicing endowment that its enabling legislation forced transactions 
to absorb. The alternatives would be a well-resourced intermediary based on the French model, 
or a vehicle far less substantive that relied upon contractual agents to administer its lending, as 
                                                 
61  Through the second and third pillars of Basel II.    20
with cash securitization deals. It is certainly possible that the 2007 credit crisis will lead to 
increasing use of and support for such models in a range of jurisdictions, including civil law 
jurisdictions in East Asia. 
 
Securitization in the US has informed transactional and regulatory developments in almost all 
states where transactions have been completed. However, neither those practices, which often 
vary from state to state,
62 nor concerns nor conflicts of law identified as threats to the integrity of 
securitization are necessarily optimal models or warnings for practice elsewhere.
63 The 
experiences of Japan and Korea shows that civil law jurisdictions in East Asia can support 
healthy securitized transaction volumes involving a variety of risks. If the 2007 market 
dislocation leads to a reassessment of the desirable extent of cash and synthetic securitization, 
its consequences in transferring risk from regulated intermediaries, or reconsideration of the 
regulation of transaction parties, then one result may be to see securitization’s drivers shift from 




IV.  National Regulations and International Capital Standards 
 
This section examines the relationship between securitization and the institutional background 
against which it has developed, including differences between national practices. 
 
A.  Regulatory Incentives to Securitization 
 
It is essential to distinguish between securitization as a form of economic disintermediation and 
that which is substantially induced by regulation or accounting rules, seen most clearly among 
bank intermediaries. Economic disintermediation as described in Section 2 relies on its user’s 
perception of current and future transaction costs in relation to organization and funding. 
Regulation and accounting are relevant in this context only secondarily, notably in relation to 
disclosure. By contrast, the securitization incentive that Basel I introduced for established 
lenders was rapid, unanticipated, and profound, even though an acknowledged objective of 
financial regulation is to alter the behavior of the target and provide it with incentives to conduct 
appropriate risk management and internal compliance.
64 
 
Financial regulation has increasingly come to be associated with internationally framed accords 
or principles, negotiated among state officials and adopted in harmony within national statutory 
or administrative settings. The work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a long-
established example of this institutional process.
65 It also represents an example of 
transnational commercial law, characterized as: 
                                                 
62  US states with securitization laws include Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, South Dakota, 
Texas, and Virginia. Delaware, a popular corporate state domicile, legislated to assert the primacy of securitized transactions 
against third-party creditor claims and other threats (Delaware Asset- Backed Securities Facilitation Act 2002). The act declares 
that ‘the term "securitization transaction" shall be construed broadly’, ibid at §2702A. 
63  Concerns include possible conflicts with the US Bankruptcy Code, challenges to an originator’s sale of claims, and the legal 
status of secured claims (Janger, 2004; Plank, 2004; Schwarcz, 2004). A recent attack argues in consequence that securitization 
relies on “dubious doctrinal foundations” (Kettering 2007, page 10), but these are issues more of public policy than law. 
64  According to Llewellyn (1999), “regulation involves a process of creating incentive compatible contracts so that regulated firms 
have an incentive to behave in a way consistent with the social objectives of systemic stability and investor protection. If 
incentive contracts […] are badly constructed and improperly designed, they might fail to reduce systemic risk […] or have 
undesirable side-effects,” pages 6–7. For the Basel committee agreeing on common capital guidelines in 1987, ”a modification 
in banks’ behavior was the point of the exercise” (Hayward, 1990, page 794), with the recognition ”that banks would need to 
earn higher profits if they are to service the new capital”, id., page 795. 
65  See Kane (2005). The Basel process is seen as effective by certain scholars of public international law (Kingsbury, Krisch,    21
[…] law which is not particular to or the product of any one legal system but 
represents a convergence of rules drawn from several legal systems or even, in 
the view of its more expansive exponents, a collection of rules which are entirely 
national and have their force by virtue of international usage and its observance 
by the merchant community. In other words, it is the rules, not merely the actions 
or events that cross national boundaries.
66 
  
Bank demand for securitization since the late-1980s has been driven by increasingly 
harmonized capital regulation, which created strong transaction incentives among both bank 
originators and bank investors. This form of capital regulation created potential value and the 
enabling devices for securitization to reduce transaction costs. Just as transaction costs are 
regarded by institutional economists as the catalyst for the transformation of firms as economic 
organizations, so regulation has a similar effect among financial intermediaries. In recent years, 
this seems also to have been magnified, with intense transaction use spread among a 
broadening population of banks. In terms of transnational commercial law, securitization by 
capital-regulated intermediaries has arguably been an intrinsic part of the Basel process. 
 
The Basel Capital Accord’s application of banded weightings to loans and other risk assets—
together with standard capital provisioning and the creation of distinct tiers of regulatory 
capital—immediately became critical in credit preferences, although not in overall credit 
creation. Capital-intensive instruments such as committed standby lines of credit quickly lost 
favor, especially where competition eroded compensation for such lines. Banks that had 
formerly targeted net returns on assets as a measure of operating performance found that peer 
pressure made it essential to manage the accumulation of risk and both actual and regulatory 
capital according to a series of metrics, including returns on risk-adjusted assets, and on the 
component layers of regulatory capital set by the Basel Committee. 
 
The result was a profound effect on transaction costs and an encouragement for many firms to 
separate credit origination from considerations of risk accumulation.
67 It thus helped intensify the 
rewards of active organizational and balance sheet management. Basel I also induced portfolio 
arbitrage and credit distortions, so as to reinforce the development of securitization and credit 
risk transfer markets. This perspective sees securitization and credit risk transfer as secondary 
results of harmonized regulatory principles, and a substantial explanation of securitization and 
other forms of credit risk transfer developed by banks since the late-1980s. 
 
The further impact of modern transaction technology and capital regulation was to steadily 
encourage the prolific transfer of credit risk to hedge funds and other lightly-regulated 
intermediaries, and encourage the creation of SIVs and investment conduits designed to 
maximize the returns from capital and accounting arbitrage. In the past decade, this in turn has 
influenced the nature, composition, and funding of all bank risk assets and radically altered the 
use of structured finance techniques by many banks, especially an elite group of major banks 
that is  most committed to structured finance and risk management, and which represent a 
powerful participatory lobby in the Basel process.
68 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Stewart Wiener, 2005; Kapstein, 2006; Slaughter, 2004) but criticized by political economists as secretive and relying on 
discriminatory ”public-private coalitions” (Underhill, 2006, page 23), and as usurping of national legislative processes by some 
administrative lawyers (Barr and Goldsmith, 2006). A thorough chronology of the Basel process appears in Alford (2005). 
66  Goode (1997) page 2. 
67 Some critics assert that it may have provoked casual standards of credit appraisal and management of the kind now 
associated with US subprime mortgage lending, see Section 4. 
68  See also Footnote 75.    22
As Basel I created incentives for both systemic and transactional arbitrage which Basel II in part 
aims to remove,
69 so the emphasis in bank securitization thus changed from elective strategy to 
regulatory arbitrage. Not only did the introduction of the first capital accord cause banks to 
manage their credit portfolios to meet regulatory incentives, making securitization a commonly 
used tool, it also acquainted many investor classes with both securitized transactions and 
regulatory capital instruments.
70 In Asia under both Basel I and Basel II, credit risk transfer and 
the subsequent loss of regulatory capture of risk may have become more of a concern than the 
erosion of bank capital resulting from any cyclical downturn. At the same time, regulators know 
that the proliferation of securitization represents a means to lessen or eliminate the mismatches 
inherent in traditional bank credit creation. 
 
B.  Basel II Implementation 
 
Basel II is intended to improve the economic rationality of regulatory incentives for credit risk 
transfer and require regulatory capital more closely to reflect actual economic risks: regulatory 
capital and economic capital should become largely equivalent. It may also remove incentives to 
securitization that arose with Basel I and result in new shifts in retained bank credit portfolios.
71 
In states where Basel II is fully adopted, capital relief will depend on more realistic economic 
considerations similar to the precepts of general international accounting practice.
72 The 
replacement of broad risk categories with more closely-defined or “granular” weightings is 
essential in this change. Last, Basel II may capture certain lending by non-banks through 
widening the geographical scope of effective compliance and supervision, and indirectly 




Basel II’s impact on access to credit for smaller enterprises is yet unknown and may vary widely 
among national markets according to local practices.
74 Critics of capital regulation predicted 
while Basel II was under negotiation that lowering the cost of well-rated credit risk would slow 
lending to “vital” small firms,
75 especially for banks in less creditworthy economies. This may be 
challenged by more recent findings in German bank lending to emerging-market borrowers.
76 
                                                 
69  Jobst (2005) gives a robust quasi-official explanation of Basel II’s aims in this regard. 
70  That Basel I incentivized securitization as transactional arbitrage was clear prior to its formal implementation in the early 1990s, 
when price signals led banks in affected states to transfer assets that were to become subject to unfavorable weightings. 
More complex but similarly anticipatory transfers have been prolific since 2004–05, when the final form of Basel II became 
known. 
71  The largest direct effect for most banks (due to conventional balance sheet leverage) may be seen in the scope and scale of 
regulatory capital-raising deals. This is well advanced in Asia and elsewhere. See also Footnote 74. 
72  Contrasted with the narrower “true sale” criterion used by US regulators to determine capital relief, and in accordance with the 
International Accounting Standards Board’s International Financial Reporting Standards. 
73  US regulators sought to regulate hedge fund activity in this indirect way through the supervision of banks that provide fund 
clients with credit lines. 
74  The Basel Committee conducted quantitative impact studies in 2002–06 to estimate possible change outcomes to minimum 
capital levels under Basel II. The most recent study (QI5) surveyed banks in 32 states (of which Australia, Indonesia, Japan, 
and Singapore are considered in this paper) but no national results have been published. The amounts of capital that banks 
expect to maintain in respect of lending to major companies and to SMEs varied according to the sophistication of the bank’s 
domicile and whether it intends to adopt Basel II’s standard or internal ratings-based approaches to calculating risk capital. 
Similarly, only banks using the standard assessment model were likely to make a significant addition to regulatory capital in 
respect of securitized risks. In principle, such banks are less likely to be arrangers of structured transactions compared to those 
adopting the internal ratings-based model. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006b). 
75  For example Griffith-Jones, Segoviano, and Spratt (2002). This finding may be influenced by a fall in cross-border capital flows to 
emerging markets during and immediately after the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. A recent assertion that Basel II may be 
deleterious to the financial systems of emerging economies includes little supporting evidence, see Claessens, Underhill and 
Zhang (2006). Less contentious is the finding that Basel II may have an overall pro-cyclical effect on capital and thus on credit 
creation. 
76  Liebig, Porath, Weder and Wedow (2007). See also Jobst (2006).    23
Lending to SMEs in both developed and emerging economies often relies on third-party 
collateral, sometimes provided by owner-managers. The pattern is widespread in East Asia, 
especially in common law jurisdictions. Implementation of Basel II may establish to what extent 
SME credit creation relies on such credit risk substitution. To the extent that loans to Asian 
SMEs are supported by collateral that is subject to verifiable valuation, banks will have less 
regulatory incentive under the new regime to shed the resulting credit risk. Such SME lending 
that is cash flow-based will require a higher contribution of capital, making securitization of the 
resulting risk an attractive portfolio strategy, providing that credit can be created on a sufficient 
scale. More sophisticated appraisals of commercial credit risk could eventually encourage 
greater SME lending that relies on securitization for its cost effectiveness. This would represent 
a partial return to the economic non-regulatory function of securitization. 
 
National implementation of Basel II in Asia is uneven to date and in some cases subject to 
political delays that have taken advantage of a hiatus in US implementation.
77 Other regional 
anomalies may emerge where asset originators wishing to securitize claims have chosen or 
been forced to adopt the standardized model of capital regulation, at least in the early life of the 
revised accord. Whether Asia’s regulators adopt Basel II enthusiastically in part or in total, the 
most pressing questions relate to the implementation of the supervision and disclosure 
standards in the second and third pillars. Given that bank regulation comprises rule-setting, the 
monitoring of behavior, and the supervision of individual intermediaries, it can be argued that 
the monitoring function was relatively neglected prior to 1997/98.
78 This is a long-standing 
concern and the approach and composition of Basel II is a chance to correct any remaining 
gaps. The effect of higher supervisory standards on future securitization is potentially important 
since a lack of appropriate material for cash transactions has been observed throughout the 
region so as to make transaction economics unattractive. Higher and more uniformly enforced 
standards for supervision, compliance and monitoring are likely to be conducive to the 
identification of feasible pool risks. Weak or nonexistent banking performance data make 
supervision difficult and cash securitization impossible. 
 
When global credit conditions recover, the revised risk weightings will also create an incentive to 
banks in East Asia to transfer or securitize new types of credit risks. This might include SME 
loans and commitments or trade finance receivables, but the outcome will depend also on 
factors unrelated to regulation, including aspects of commercial banking practice and corporate 
behavior. SME securitization has been successful in Japan largely due to support from state 
agencies or municipal authorities.
79 For SME and consumer credit securitization to be used 
more widely in East Asia, a means must be found to either make deeply subordinated risk 
acceptable to third-party investors, since the current practice in which originators retain a 
residual risk would be an unattractive cost under Basel II, or procure external credit 




                                                 
77  Implementation in its most comprehensive form is decided only in Australia; Hong Kong, China; and New Zealand, and in a 
somewhat less complete form in Singapore. There is uncertainty as to the phasing and extent of implementation elsewhere, 
including the remaining developed economies. US regulators announced their final Basel II implementation rules only in late 
2007 see http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20071102a.htm (accessed 15 December 2007). 
78  See Footnote 5. 
79  The central government agency Japan Finance Corporation for Small and Medium Enterprise (JASME) is a well-established 
lender to SMEs. But since 2004, JASME has also occasionally provided credit support for commercial lenders in securitizing 
SME risks through cash and synthetic CDOs. Similar transactions have been completed in Korea and are mooted in 
Singapore.    24
C.  Variations in Regulation and Practice 
 
Basel has inspired abundant literature in several disciplines, but two elements of its 
development are neglected. First, the influence of commercial interests and ways in which state 
officials represent their commercial constituents are recognized by political and economic 
commentators,
80 but the financial and administrative legal literature gives little attention to how 
commercial interests contribute directly to the direction and detail of the committee’s policy 
formation.
81 This factor influenced the initiation and modification of Basel I, its 1996 market risk 
amendment, and Basel II to a degree that is participatory and cannot be characterized as 
commercial lobbying or regulatory consultation. More recently, the major commercial credit 
rating agencies have participated in the process, but only recently attracted the regulatory 
scrutiny applied to the banking sector.
82 
 
Second, the Basel narrative commonly neglects national practices except where they become 
the subject of contentious negotiation between states.
83 The nature of domestic financial 
systems and the behavior of financial intermediaries in domestic and offshore markets is usually 
conditioned by past activity and institutions.
84 Contemporary commercial lending practice differs 
between US and German domestic banks, for example, for reasons that can be traced to 
contrasting 19th century lending, collateral and corporate governance practices in England and 
France, respectively. National variations in banking practice persist, even where large 
commercial interests use globalized financial markets to borrow or invest. Not only does today’s 
credit and transaction practice extend from that past, but the nature of financial regulation 
reflects the results of ongoing competition among national regulators that inevitably have 
different approaches, despite sharing well understood goals of creating common standards to 
encourage stability and avoid post-shock contagion.
85 A simple characterization of conventional 
Anglo-American transactional banking practice compared with a traditional German relationship 
banking model, taken with dissimilar rules on disclosure to investors or banking confidentiality 
can imply settings that are conducive to different securitization outcomes. This is apparent in 
both a legal and regulatory context and in contractual structures for transaction management. 
 
                                                 
80  Regulatory capture is assessed by Posner (1974). Barr and Miller (2006), page 19, note that the Basel process is informal and its 
opacity readily allows for such capture. Stigler (1971) argues that commercial interests demand regulation of the state to favor 
their own interests or help limit the costs that the state would otherwise require them to bear. In this analysis, the Basel process 
represents both lobbying of national Basel Committee members by their home banks, and an international setting for elite banks 
to submit to regulation that they are able both to influence and tolerate. Laffont and Tirole (1991) analyze regulatory capture to 
take account of the asymmetry of information available to regulators and colluding commercial interests. Political analysis of the 
Basel process sees commercial involvement as generally malign, for example, Wood (2005) questions “[t]o what extent should 
regulators abdicate their privilege to control the market, and instead to work with it?,” pages 125–126, even while accepting that 
consultation with commercial interests may be an essential practicality. 
81 The “private element in global administration” is acknowledged by scholars of administrative law in the operations of self-
regulatory bodies such as the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, see Kingsbury,Krisch, Stewart Wiener (2005) 
page 20. 
82  But see Section 4. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) published a voluntary code of conduct for 
credit rating agencies that has been accepted by the leading firms in the sector, but which is neither specific nor mandatory 
(IOSCO, 2004). Basel II provides for national regulators to decide the sources of ratings that are acceptable in classifying certain 
transaction risks. 
83 The BIS QI5 survey notes that changes to capital provisions resulting from the revised treatment of securitized risks varies 
considerably according to national provisions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006b, page 32). The institutional 
importance of this form of path dependence is commonly attributed to Roe (1999). 
84  The institutional importance of this form of path dependence is commonly attributed to Roe (1999). 
85  An even-handed exposition of the rationale for financial regulation cites three objectives in systemic stability, encouraging sound 
financial intermediaries, and protecting the interest of other users, (Llewellyn 1999), pages 8–9, but fails to address problems 
arising from the possibility of equilibrium instability, and transactional incentives given by regulation to regulated and lightly 
regulated intermediaries. Arner (2007) broadens the analysis to examine the effects of regulation on financial sector and general 
development.    25
These differences have two implications for structured finance. First, any single national legal 
and institutional setting may not favor securitized transactions or any universal model of 
structured finance contracts. Second, it may be inappropriate or inefficient to import any 
established transaction model without identifying the need for adaptation to local needs. Errors 
of this kind have been associated with promoters hoping to create familiar transactions for 
prospective investors but to the detriment of contractual integrity. The general result may be 
constricted usage, as in the Philippines, for example. This concern extends beyond the way that 
commercial lawyers seek contractual solutions to problematic laws or regulations, which is not 
uncommon in East Asian securitization.
86 
 
More positively, Basel II is highly complex in its complete form for both regulators and their 
supervisory targets, but includes concessions that enable states to legitimately adopt its 
provisions in stages or according to need. Basel II’s risk weightings are eventually to be applied 
uniformly but many aspects of national supervision will differ. 
 
To what extent has a national legal or regulatory setting acted as an incentive to securitization, 
especially in the capital regulated sectors? Much securitization activity has an orientation that 
reflects its modern roots in the US, where securitization developed as a result of competitive 
tensions between two parts of a divided financial industry, and was heavily influenced by state 
and federal law and regulation, and social attitudes to the banking sector. Securitization in the 
US markets is inevitably a systemic and transactional influence, but may not be a model for 
elsewhere, in spite of globalization trends of convergence in intermediary behavior, regulation, 
and financial instruments and their treatment in law. US practice has a practical value in that 
many international and national markets find it attractive to sell foreign transactions to US 
investors, despite the costs of conforming with demanding disclosure requirements. 
 
This is especially true in securitized transactions, given their structural need to target different 
classes of homogenous investors, which is a particular feature of the extensive US investor 
base. While the US is the source of modern securitization technology, the reasons for it to 
enthusiastically adopt this form of actual loan defeasance in the 1970s are embedded in many 
aspects of US law and financial practice.
87 Such variables affect sources of bank funding, 
encourage the targeting of returns by banks, limit the term of house loans, encourage the 
formation of mortgage loan aggregators, and generally induce credit risk transfer. These factors 
are not unique but exist nowhere else to the same comprehensive extent. Thus in promoting 
institutional reforms it would be inappropriate to identify other markets as synonymous with 
those of the US,
88 but perfectly acceptable to use or amend US transaction technology. 
 
More broadly, the “Law and Finance” school has suggested that a primary means by which law 
influences financial development is through contract formation and enforcement.
89 This view 
aligns with the general economic motives for securitization, which are related to transaction 
costs factors and not primarily to financial sector regulation,
90 and which may increase in 
importance after the dislocation of 2007 credit crisis. 
 
                                                 
86  For example, the simple model shown in Appendix 3 that uses sequential onshore and offshore SPVs. 
87  Including legislation after the 1929 Great Crash controlling banking by type and by geographical coverage, securities legislation, 
quantitative controls on lending, interest rate ceilings, the comparatively attractive risk-return profile of traditional mortgage 
lending, constraints on diversification by mortgage lenders, and a societal wariness of banks. 
88  See also Cacdac, Warnock and Warnock (2007). 
89  Empirical analysis shows the US financial sector conforms with this result, even though financial activity in the US is subject to a 
complex rule-based regulatory environment. 
90  For example, Schwarcz (2002).    26
These factors have two consequences in an East Asian context. First, even though ASEAN+3 
banking supervision was generally poor prior to 1997, its subsequent and future improvement 
depend upon introducing appropriate objective and minimum common standards, not on any 
single model solution. Second, if securitization is to grow in the region on a significant scale, it is 
likely to resemble but not mirror the transaction model and usage of other economies. 
 
One further point arises from the staggered national implementation of Basel II’s revised risk 
weightings. To the extent that banks adopting the standardized approach to capital adequacy 
maintain subsidiary or affiliated operations in overseas economies that introduce the new 
weightings at a different time to the bank’s home regulator, then Basel’s plan of implementation 
may encourage credit risks to be located so as to achieve an optimal use of capital. The impact 
of this discrepancy has not been quantified but has been taken to be modest. However, this 
relatively minor aspect raises the possibility of a more complex form of systemic regulatory 
arbitrage between unconnected parties in economies where Basel implementation differs, and 
the opportunity that a complex matrix of regulation may offer to even simple lenders. 
Cooperation among regulators would need to be reconsidered in this event.
91 Such practices 
may also evolve from the significant credit-related activity now associated with lightly-regulated 
hedge fund investors. 
 
Basel II conforming states will force regulatory capital more accurately to reflect credit risk, and 
improve the economic rationality of regulatory incentives. Removing Basel I’s incentives to 
securitization may also lead to new shifts in retained bank portfolios. Changes to the incentive 
structure that regulation has created for financial sector securitization will be incomplete without 
a parallel reexamination of the supervisory and accounting background. This is the setting 
against which markets in securitized transactions entered their most unsettled period to date in 
2007, which is the main subject of Section 5. 
 
 
V. Recent  Trends 
 
The medium-term future of securitization in all its forms must be considered in the context of the 
severe dislocation experienced by global financial markets in 2007. It is certain that, in 
response, there will be qualitative changes in regulation and supervision. Consequences may 
arise in changes to national and harmonized financial regulations and crisis prevention 
measures, credit rating and accounting practices, and they will likely induce changes in 
transaction structuring and post-execution management. This section will distinguish between 
recent global events and aspects important to East Asia’s markets, and seek to identify what 
may transpire in both securitization use and regulatory change following a recovery in credit and 
liquidity conditions. 
 
A. Global  Disruption 
 
A definitive assessment of the causes of the crisis is premature, but several features are clear, 
and point to a shock more significant than a periodic downturn in global credit conditions.
92 In 
particular, the widespread loss of confidence that began in early 2007 with increases in loan 
losses and payment delinquencies among certain US subprime mortgage lenders developed in 
                                                 
91  The second principle of Basel II’s guidelines for home-host regulator implementation provides that “The home country supervisor 
is responsible for the oversight of the implementation of the New Accord for a banking group on a consolidated basis.” Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2006a), page 11. 
92  A narrative of events until end-September 2007 appears in Bank of England (2007), pages 5–22.    27
the third quarter into a collapse of liquidity in many structured and conventional financial 
markets, a period of intense risk aversion among global investors in structured issues, and a 
hiatus in market valuation mechanisms for most structured transactions.
93 These events were 
accompanied by a succession of unusually severe downgradings of structured issues by the 
three leading international credit rating agencies. A number of financial intermediaries 
announced or predicted substantial investment and trading losses on structured transactions, 
both held directly and in SIVs and other similar vehicles,
94 and in August several leading central 
banks began to provide exceptional liquidity to the interbank markets as part of their general 
liquidity and lender of last resort facilities. 
 
The disruption of the first 3 quarters of 2007 included pricing dislocations in several important 
markets previously considered deep and liquid, and widespread losses of confidence, not only 
in structured products but also in intermediaries involved in the markets, whether as originator, 
arranger, or investor. It also included bank failures and reorganizations resulting from illiquidity, 
insolvency, or a terminal combination of both conditions. With investor participation evaporating, 
a mid-year hiatus occurred in new cash or synthetic securitized and covered bond transactions. 
By late September, a trickle of new transactions was announced, all more modest in scale and 
generous in pricing than earlier issues. The closing of the securitized new issue markets was 
temporary but is likely to end only with a radical adjustment in the commercial terms and 
complexity of feasible transactions. 
 
The most severe dislocation was associated with all forms of synthetic transactions, and 
especially CDO or cash transactions associated with loan aggregators, that is, mortgage 
arrangers who create and warehouse loans solely for subsequent packaging and sale. 
However, investors took the view that all structured risk was tainted with unquantifiable losses 
and the loss of confidence penetrated all credit markets—a classic case of asymmetric 
information, adverse selection, and contagious loss of confidence. Although these events may 
be part of a cyclical downturn, some aspects were sufficiently alarming to lead to calls for broad 
regulatory change to curb financialization. A recovery is likely to be accompanied by regulatory 




The path to substantial losses among banks and investors began with credit stresses in weaker 
sections of the US home mortgage market. Property values associated with US subprime 
borrowers fell in the second half of 2006, and began to be disclosed by major lenders in the first 
quarter of 2007. From there, an accumulation of market analyst and rating agency warnings 
quickly caused confidence to fall, with many participants fearful of being unable to quantify the 
extent to which their investments or counterparties were at risk. Widespread risk aversion and a 
shortage of bank liquidity thus led ABS and CDO holders to be unable to find a market price for 
                                                 
93  One BIS report was prescient of these developments: 
Growing dependence on financial markets has also increased the exposure to market turbulence. […] [I]n periods 
of severe market unrest or uncertainty, a whole group of housing finance lenders may suddenly find it difficult to 
obtain funding. Thus, although internationally active financial institutions build up exposures to non-domestic 
mortgages to diversify risks, spillover effects from foreign housing markets could become a source of concern. 
Committee on the Global Financial System (2006), page 32. 
94  This included banks domiciled in the PRC; Hong Kong, China; Japan; and Singapore. To date, the greatest losses have been 
posted by banks in US, Germany, and UK. 
95 Following a direction of the G-7 finance ministers to IOSCO, the Financial Stability Forum, and Basel Committee, IOSCO 
announced on 8 November 2007 a structured finance task force to examine credit rating agency practice, accounting, valuation, 
transparency and due diligence, and risk management and prudential supervision.    28
either dealing or valuation, or raise or renew funding. This notably included conduits and SIVs 
whose risk exposure was ostensibly of high credit quality.
96 
 
Until the results of the current accounting year are published by all leading participants, the 
main unknown outcome of the crisis is the extent to which banks will be forced to fund, charge 
off, or consolidate risk that has been held in conduits and SIVs, as well as resulting demands for 
new equity or regulatory capital. A related concern arises in the outcome of falls in CDO and 
bank credit ratings, which will lessen the willingness of investors to make new commitments in 
bank risk, securitized assets, or covered bonds. 
 
B. Credit  Risk  Transfer 
 
Among the most profound financial market developments in the post-Bretton Woods world of 
deregulated international finance has been the growing emphasis and ease of credit risk 
transfer. This relies especially on two related financial innovations, credit derivatives, and cash 
or synthetic securitization.
97 It has led to a diffusion of risk geographically, and by type of 
counterparty or intermediary. Yet before 2007, it had generally been believed that access to 
credit risk transfer might help in crisis avoidance.
98 Instead, credit risk transfer seems to have 
led in 2007 to profound uncertainty in the interbank markets, caused by valuation difficulties 
associated with outstanding structured transactions, and the view that dispersal of risk created 
problems in credit assessment. If the location of credit risk perceived to be threatened could not 
be identified, then banks and other investors would be unable to determine with any confidence 
the extent to which any counterparty might itself be exposed to potential problems. This 
represents an apparent reversal of finance theory’s presumption that portfolio diversification is a 
favorable and risk averse long-term strategy, and which in this form has underlain recent views 
of financial innovation. The BIS in particular became associated with a generally favorable view 
of credit risk transfer that relies on the benefits of risk dispersal. The scale of the 2007 shock will 
change that outlook. 
 
The results are analyzed here in institutional terms. For example, if securitization is dependent 
upon contractual integrity and can be associated with gains in transparency, how can periods of 
extreme illiquidity and lapsing confidence be explained, as experienced in all major markets for 
securitized instruments in mid-2007? One need is for greater focus on contract completeness. If 
the benefits of increasingly free credit risk transfer are not to be wholly lost, then transparent 
transaction standards are essential, and the global regulatory system and lenders of last resort 
may need to focus more openly on liquidity rather than capital adequacy alone. 
 
A well-received BIS study in 2005 drew on surveys of market regulators and participants to 
conclude credit risk transfer to be beneficial overall. A diffusion of risk that it enables would 
offset a lack of direct regulatory control or insight arising when risk assets leave the capital-
regulated banking system or insurance sector, especially given an assumption of indirect or 
                                                 
96  See for example an announcement made on 6 September 2007 to the London Stock Exchange by a Citigroup managed SIV, 
Beta Finance Corporation, available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/LSECWS/IFSPages/MarketNews (accessed 15 
December 2007) and on file with the authors. The fund had risk exposure in August of approximately $22.7 billion, of which $59 
million was to CDOs based on (then) highly-rated subprime ABS issues. The remainder of the portfolio was held in AAA 
structured securities or unrated “super-senior” notes that rank in priority to AAA-rated tranches of the same CDO transactions. In 
spite of this theoretically healthy profile, investor caution made Beta Finance unable fully to fund itself from usual short-term 
sources. 
97  Other aspects involve harmonization in aspects of private commercial law, for example the increasing similarity and economic 
effects of loan and bond contracts. 
98 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005). Others argue that credit risk transfer has a negative impact on capital 
adequacy (Jobst, 2005).    29
outsourced control. The notion that bank credit lines with non-bank intermediaries would act as 
an effective distant control device, as might “a twitch upon the thread”,
99 has now become 
implausible given that many SIVs and conduits have the primary objective of reducing their 
sponsors’ need for regulatory capital. Instead, one problem has been the participation of banks 
more directly, which has endangered capital, however modestly.
100 
 
The first SIVs were set up to garner funds from third-party investors and generate management 
fees for their creators.
101 They are generally distinct from bank conduits, which are 
unconsolidated, non-capital attracting vehicles used by banks to house revenue-seeking 
activity. Conduits rely heavily on sales of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) for funding, 
and the seizure associated with this market from July 2007 in both Europe and North America 
has led to considerable concerns as to the long-term solvency of conduits.
102 Those banks 
associated with their creation and management have usually provided standby lines of credit, 
which may entail commitments to fund the conduit in the event of it becoming impossible to sell 
ABCP. The result has been increasing pressure for conduits with outstanding assets to be 
wound up or consolidated into the sponsoring banks’ balance sheets, which would necessitate 
very sizeable additions to regulatory capital. 
 
In the long run, the use of SIVs is likely to become more conservative in all aspects of leverage, 
risk management and funding, and conduits will not exist in the form known until mid-2007. 
There may be contractual or structural solutions to this dilemma, such as to include the creation 
of reserves, or the inclusion of recourse rights to investors in a way similar to cash covered 
bonds, but in each case the result will be for risk to be consolidated. The concept of specialist 
vehicles to house structured investments is not eliminated by Basel II, for it contains provision 
for banks adopting the internal rating-based regulatory treatment to provide committed standby 
lines to SIVs at a risk weighting of only 20%, providing the lines may be used only in times of 
general illiquidity. 2007 would clearly have been one such time.
103 
 
One recent empirical study of the behavior of regulated banks in conditions of freely available 
credit risk transfer using credit derivatives and including synthetic securitization concludes that 
the BIS was correct to evince benefits from risk dispersal, and points to efficiency gains arising 
when banks use such techniques.
104 It may be ironic that in institutional terms, regardless of 
commercial factors, the risk management benefits of securitization in intermediation appear to 
have been neutralized by the common SIV structure. 
 
All of these events and a shift in confidence in the results of prolific credit risk transfer can be 
expected to have consequences in the distribution of risk, the objectives and balance of activity 
within intermediaries, and eventually in new forms of intermediaries. Credit risk transfer 
                                                 
99  A fictional detective explains apprehending a criminal in a manner similar to the Basel Committee’s home- host objective “with an 
unseen hook and an invisible line which is long enough to let him wander to the ends of the world, and still to bring him back here 
with a twitch upon the thread,” Chesterton (1929). 
100 For example Burton (2007), Tucker (2007), Batson and Morse (2007), all describing subprime related losses by Asian banks. 
101 See Footnote 24. 
102 Risk assets held by SIVs and bank conduits at the end of June 2007 exceeded $1,500 billion and $350 billion, respectively. Both 
types of vehicle have been significant holders of cash and synthetic securitized assets, and may in aggregate have held RMBS 
positions amounting to 25% of total assets in mid-2007, see Bank of England (2007), page 19 and page 21. The extent of the 
mid-2007 interruption to SIV and bank conduit funding is considerable: as at end-June 2007, US dollar ABCP represented 54.1% 
of all outstanding US dollar commercial paper and exceeded $1,140 billion (source, Federal Reserve Board at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/ accessed 15 December 2007). 
103 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006a),§ 638. The qualifying term ‘general market disruption’ is defined at § 580. 
A similar remark appears in Axford and Hart (2007). 
104 Goderis, Marsh, Vall Castillo and Wagner (2006).    30
techniques appear certainly to have spread risk among many more legal parties, and have 
induced funded and contingent claims traditionally held by capital-regulated bank intermediaries 
to flow to other types of parties, be they hedge funds by any conventional understanding, 
institutional investors, interests of high net worth investors or others. At the same time, much of 
this dispersal among parties has not entailed risk leaving the conventional banking sector, but 
rather seen it become more widely held within the global banking community as a whole. Thus 
small German public sector lenders, the ostensible mission of which was traditionally to provide 
credit for activity within a narrow geographical domain, accumulate through a vehicle domiciled 
in Ireland a portfolio of US subprime mortgages, the value of which collapses or cannot be 
appraised, and leaves the vehicle unable to renew its liquid liabilities to fund its asset book. 
These kinds of arrangements threaten the continuation of structured finance techniques. 
 
C.  Transaction Appraisal and Management 
 
The past decade has seen rapid growth in subprime mortgage lending to households with 
impaired or insufficient credit histories, notably in the US but also in Australia, Canada, and the 
UK (collectively, the “Anglo-American economies”). The activity is “dominated by new loan 
originators, who are not deposit-takers”,
105 and many will not be regulated as conventional 
lenders. The recent outcome in the subprime mortgage sectors and that part of it classed as 
predatory lending suggest a failure in the contractual mechanisms for transaction appraisal and 
ongoing management. By this argument, it is not securitization as a concept that is the cause of 
instability, but improperly designed incentive structures leading to poor design of complex 
transactions, inadequate contract enforcement and risk appraisal. 
 
In the same  period,  forms  of  predatory  lending became a sizeable segment of the market in 
home mortgage loans in the US,
106 and represent a considerable portion of the market in 
subprime mortgage loans.
107 Practices in this market segment were controversial prior to the 
deterioration in credit conditions in 2006. Certain US academics and mortgage industry 
representatives have described structured finance as the essential driver of predatory lending. 
These home loans are always securitized, demand steep tranching to support aggressive 
transaction economics, and may be said to capture a crucial moral hazard of credit risk transfer, 
where information is withheld from an investor. They are thus unwilling to see securitization as a 
                                                 
105 Committee on the Global Financial System (2006), page 17. 
106 Engel and McCoy (2002), page 1,257, describe predatory lending as “exploitative high-cost loans to naïve borrowers.” They 
suggest that securitization is a change to the operation of the US home mortgage market that from the 1980s caused growth in 
new loans to accelerate and allow new loan providers to enter the market, id at 1,273-74. This is uncontroversial but the same 
authors’ more recent claim that securitized transactions have induced predatory lending appears to be assertive (Engel and 
McCoy, 2007). A similar attack is made by Peterson (2007), pages 6–7, who describes a process that is abusive, and includes 
evasive activity: 
[S]ecuritization […] has not yet proven capable of reliably providing high quality services to consumers and 
investors. I believe this problem stems from the legal incentives actors in the system operate under. The one 
uniform feature of residential mortgage law is its failure to recognize and account for the complex financial 
innovations that have facilitated securitization structures. 
Id., page 8, but this identifies concerns for which securitization cannot be a primary cause, and which in the absence of 
securitization are likely to continue. Eggert (2007) is still more hostile, claiming before a US Senate committee that 
[S]ecuritization has transformed the American mortgage market, atomized the loan process, and to a great 
extent turned the regulation of the subprime mortgage industry over to private entities. Some aspects of the 
current meltdown of the subprime market, the increased default rate and threat of rising foreclosures, as well as 
the difficulty of crafting an adequate response to that meltdown, may be attributed to the effects of 
securitization. […] Securitization has also led to loosened and inconsistent underwriting standards. 
But this fails to support the assertion, only indicating that factors other than securitization have not been fully regulated or 
controlled. 
107 As an indication of market contributions prior to the mid-2007 credit crisis, US Mortgage Bankers Association survey data 
suggest that 19% of mortgage loans created in the first half of 2006 were made to subprime debtors, with 45% of those 
borrowers using the proceeds to buy homes.    31
technique that has been used by lenders of all kinds, including those making loans that might 
generally be criticized or made void as part of public policy. 
 
Critics of securitization in this context thus suggest that it supports predatory lending, and 
induces fault and malpractice by allowing abuses arising from the moral hazard of assigning or 
transferring poorly-originated claims. The removal of a conventional lender’s administrative 
interest with the sale of a loan leads inevitably to that moral hazard: 
 
The protections that securitization provides investors do not safeguard 
borrowers. To the contrary, securitization inflicts negative externalities on 
subprime borrowers in at least four ways. First, securitization funds small, thinly 
capitalized lenders and brokers [… that…] are more prone to commit loan 
abuses […]. Second, securitization dilutes incentives by lenders and brokers to 
avoid making loans with excessive default risk […]. Third, securitization denies 
injured borrowers legal recourse against assignees […]. Lastly, securitization 
drives up the price of subprime loans because  investors  demand  a  lemons 




The same sources argue that securitization increases problems of adverse selection arising 
from asymmetries of information between lender and investor. They suggest that lenders have 
an incentive to securitize the poorer parts of their loan portfolios, and that ABS or MBS investors 
cannot know whether any loan or pool of loans was made soundly or is properly maintained. 
 
This attack is more a complaint against predatory or unsound lending, rather than the processes 
involved in securitization. However, it appears also to specify wrongly the nature of any 
information asymmetry between lender and securitized investor: 
 
Before the advent of securitization, lenders typically handled loans from cradle to 
grave. […] Because lenders bore the full risk of default, they had strong 
incentives to turn down observationally risky borrowers. […] The lemons [adverse 
selection] problem occurs because unbundling creates information asymmetries 




In institutional terms there is a clear difference between the knowledge that a bank lender can 
be expected to accumulate of an established corporate borrower, and its insight into a single 
consumer debtor. Yet many banks in East Asia and elsewhere extend credit to SMEs only if 
provided with collateral. Although widespread, this has been seen as an obstacle to both SME 
credit creation and loan securitization.
110 In the case of the US subprime sector, it became 
accepted practice to create a contractual framework for loan servicing and mortgage registration 




It is important to note that US practice is not a model in this respect, even though the collapse of 
the US subprime market has been a global contagion event. The credit risk profile of a complex 
corporate debtor may be far harder for an investor than a bank to assess, but a securitization 
                                                 
108 Engel and McCoy (2007), page 2,041. 
109 Id., pages 2,048–49. 
110 Booth, Arner, Lejot and Hsu (2007), pages 527–28. 
111 By means of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), a commercial mortgage loan registration vehicle used by many 
subprime loan aggregators as the beneficiary of mortgage deeds.    32
transaction that is as contractually complete as possible can create an incentive framework for 
usable information to be given to the investor.
112 The alternative to preventing the use of 
securitization in predatory loan funding is to adopt strict disclosure provisions for loan 
aggregators and agents, and to provide for the policing aggressive lending. 
 
D.  Credit Rating Agency Functions 
 
It has been recognized for some time that credit rating agencies can engage in commercially 
conflicted activities. IOSCO’s code of conduct drew attention to this concern as a regulatory 
issue but only extended to the general mission of the agencies, not their analytical techniques, 
which were viewed as sacrosanct in much the same way as many internal quantitative models 
under the Basel I market risk framework prior to the 1998 collapse of hedge funds managed by 
Long-Term Capital Management.
113 Criticism of the agencies has focused on two particular 
conflicts of interest, namely compensation being met by issuers whose securities the agencies 
appraise, and the possibility that a rating agency parent or affiliate may derive revenue or other 
benefits from issuers or their advisors. This neglects a specific actual conflict inherent in the 
origination process for structured transactions, and which the recent dislocation has exposed to 
far wider concern. It arises from the quasi-origination function that the leading rating agencies 
undertake whenever many complex transactions are under negotiation, and it is this aspect of 
the current rating agency model that is likely to be reconsidered in the medium-term. In addition, 
it is highly likely that quantitative risk modeling will be generally subject to an increase in 
regulatory minimum-setting and scrutiny, not only in structured transaction ratings but in a range 
of regulatory risk considerations. 
 
This potential conflict has become widely criticized within the context of structured finance 
markets, since agency involvement in the creation of new transactions is profound, interactive, 
and no less significant than that of arrangers. The resolution of this conflict may include greater 
transparency in the rating process for structured transactions, and explicit regulatory supervision 
of agency organization and activity. The greater difficulty may be to create a new model of 
independent investment appraisal specifically designed for structured finance risks, which 
allows for challenges to rating agency opinions. If the leading rating agencies are to hold a 
central place in the transactional process (as well as the regulatory process under at least the 
standard level of Basel II), then the capital markets must cease to regard their opinions as mere 
contributions to investor advice. 
 
It should also be noted that periods of market disruption tend to include calls for rating agency 
reform based upon the observation that they often fail to predict imminent credit problems. This 
criticism was made in the context of the Asian financial crisis and recently after the deterioration 
in the US subprime mortgage market, during which one agency made without warning 
controversial steep downgradings of certain CDOs.
114 It is not part of this study’s purpose to 
                                                 
112  The institutional analysis of van Order (2007) summarizes at pages 2–3 the transaction cost trade-off associated with 
securitization: 
[A] reasonable way of posing the problem (of which funding structure is best) is that it can be defined by a 
tradeoff between the advantages of securitization as a low cost and elastic source of funds with the 
disadvantages of securitization due to information asymmetry between investors and lenders (a problem that 
banks tend to manage better) and costs of setting up deals (which do not apply to deposit funding), and a priori 
the balance could go either way. 
However, this fails to acknowledge the effect of wrongly-specified (and thus incomplete) contracts as the core explanation rather 
than intrinsic information asymmetry. 
113 See Footnote 73. 
114 For example, International Financing Review (2007) reported that 
S&P last week downgraded US$80m of Tier 1 mezzanine notes issued by Avendis Group's Golden Key SIV-lite 
by an astounding and possibly unprecedented 17 notches – from AAA to CCC. At the same time, it downgraded    33
evaluate the methods of the leading agencies but it is appropriate to ask how these 
organizations function within an institutional setting, and how reforms are likely to result from 
recent events. In particular, a moral dilemma arises in the iterative process used by originators 
and rating agencies to structure complex transactions in order to achieve target ratings on deal 
tranches. 
 
It has been further argued in a US context that credit rating agencies have unconstitutionally 
acquired a quasi-legal position as arbiters of the contractual integrity of securitized issues. This 
also presents a commercial conflict as the agencies derive revenue from their involvement in 
creating such securities. US rating agencies claim that their opinions are not actionable in law 
as mere opinions subject to constitutional protection, or that aggrieved investors lack a basis of 
claim since they lack a contractual relationship with the agency.
115 The paradox is that ratings 
are central to investors and increasingly risk-based regulation of intermediaries in structured 
finance, but to date they have not been successfully challenged. Indeed, the conflict that arises 
from the rating agency being compensated by the issuer is one that is essential to maintain in 
order to guard against litigation—if the agency were to be paid by the investor, this arrangement 
could not be sustained.
116 
 
Rating agency structured finance practice has been questioned by events and by securities 
regulators, notably France’s Autorité des Marches Financiers,
117 but defended by the principal 
rating agencies.
118 IOSCO’s code of conduct for credit rating agencies includes the exhortation 
that agencies use “rating methodologies that are rigorous, systematic, and, where possible, 




Yet, this is clearly not the outcome with regard to many structured or synthetic transactions in 
2007. The leading French financial regulator has questioned whether structured finance 
transactions are properly rated, pointing out that unlike with conventional debt issues with a 
single commercial or sovereign obligor, the role of the rating agency in structured transactions is 
more active, and akin to a quasi-participatory function:
120 
                                                                                                                                                             
US$174m of Tier 1 mezzanine notes from Solent Capital's Mainsail II SIV-lite by 16 notches – from AAA to 
Triple CCC+. Such sharp downgrades spurred criticism of the ratings agencies, both from market participants 
and politicians, casting doubts over the agencies' credibility and raising more questions about the value of a 
Triple A rating. That in turn cast doubt over the fundamental basis of the Basel II regulatory regime, which is 
intrinsically tied to credit ratings. 
  Bell and Rose (2007) seek to defend structured finance rating practice. Note that there are long-standing conceptual differences 
in the approach to structured transaction valuation methodology used by the three leading agencies, see also Footnote 123. 
115 Kettering (2007), pages 96–118. 
116 Id., page 108. 
117 Prada (2007). 
118 For example, Bell and Ross (2007) ask 
Why does this dialogue between rating agencies and arrangers occur at all [in structured finance 
transactions]? The answer lies in two aspects of structured finance: the first is "tranching" and the second is the 
"structured" nature of structured finance. Both are intrinsic and necessary to the structured finance market. And 
in both instances, the degree of rating agency interaction is not only beneficial to the structured finance 
market but almost certainly a prerequisite to having any kind of structured finance market at all. 
The authors omit to suggest that an alternative business model that lacks the commercial conflicts inherent in assigning a 
regulatory function to credit rating agencies. They continue to say that 
The only aim is to design a product that can find investors and still generate a positive economic return. In 
other words, structured finance is "structured". 
Ibid, page 5. 
119 IOSCO (2004), §1.2, page 4. 
120 Prada (2007).    34
can a pure rating approach be an appropriate and sufficient answer to the 






[t]he accuracy and the robustness of structured finance ratings are […] subject to 
the quality and the stability of the models that are specifically developed by each 
agency. […] as they can have a very high impact on the absolute or the 
comparative levels of market spreads.
122 
 
This point is neglected in academic commentary and by investors. The analytical methods of the 
three principal agencies are proprietary and different in approach and mechanics,
123 in addition 
to their maintaining wide variations in their respective commercial approaches. They employ 
different methods, and their ratings and approaches to warnings or making changes are taken 
by the financial sector as distinct. In addition, this has traditionally led to the belief among other 
market participants that one agency may be commonly regarded as favoring or being less likely 
to penalize certain risks. There is thus a commercial decision in selecting a rating agency, or 
choosing to engage either two or three firms to rate new issues or new classes of risk.
124 
 
It seems likely that the quasi-regulatory functions of the agencies in the Basel II process will be 
re-evaluated, at least in respect of structured transaction ratings.
125 The rating agencies have 
been criticized periodically for slow analytical reaction to deteriorating credit risks, rapid 
reappraisals, and an asymmetric view of credit improvements and declines. Concern over their 
structured finance activity is different and more fundamental. The effect of rapid changes in 
rating is less seen in sober reassessments and changes in expectations of the kind predicted by 
market economists, but in quantum-like, non-granular reactions. A fall in credit rating below a 
set level may cause no change in intellectual sentiment but a conditioned and often compulsory 
sale by institutional investors constrained by ratings-based investment criteria. The implication, 
rarely acknowledged outside the gossip of market professionals, is that ratings rarely induce or 
inform a portfolio investment decision but may permit it to happen (institutional investors 
frequently having contractual-or regulated-ratings minimum mandates for investments), or 
provide exculpatory evidence if the decision later proves mistaken. 
 
The BIS examined the activities of credit rating agencies in structured finance transactions in 
2005, and pointed to risks and potential conflicts that have been more widely and urgently 
discussed since mid-2007. Its assessment describes the vital position granted to the agencies in 
facilitating synthetic transactions due to their reliance on tranching,
126 but it may be fairer to 
stress the interactivity of this part of transaction formation. The report warned that 
 
                                                 
121 Ibid, page 7. 
122 Ibid, page 8. 
123 An explanation of the main differences is given in Raines and Rutledge (2003). Each agency has recently sought to defend its 
structured rating methodology (Bell and Rose, 2007) but at least one announced in September 2007 changes in its approach to 
rating certain CDOs. 
124 Differences in reputational considerations are trivial in the domestic US markets, where the rating agencies are ubiquitous and 
the issuer universe large and relatively homogeneous. 
125 See Footnote 95. 
126 Committee on the Global Financial System (2005), page 6.    35
[…] market participants, in using ratings, need to be aware of their limitations. 
This applies, in particular, to structured finance and the fact that the one-
dimensional nature of credit ratings based on expected loss or probability of 






It is clear from this discussion that rating agencies are interactively involved in 
more than one dimension of structured finance issues such that they cannot be 
seen as independent external assessors of the results.
128 
 
E.  East Asian Impact 
 
East Asia has been affected by the 2007 crisis but without the severe problems experienced in 
credit markets in the Anglo-American economies and to a lesser extent continental Europe. A 
number of banks have disclosed losses from investments in SIVs and CDOs but the main 
concerns to date have been consequences for liquidity and confidence pouring in from 
elsewhere, rather than problems that are intrinsic. The main structured finance activity among 
East Asian banks has been outward investment, or in modest sized or path-dependent CDOs 
issued under medium-term note programs, often geared to yield-seeking private clients. New 
issues have clearly been negatively impacted but activity in East Asia is in any event subdued, 
and the direct consequences of the crisis may be minimal. 
 
On the other hand, East Asia’s partial implementation of Basel II may leave it able to introduce 
future modifications that seek to build on the disruption of 2007. This may cover more closely 
defined regulation of loan origination, contractual post-advance loan servicing where the loan is 
made with the express intention of being packaged for sale. It may also involve some common 
default means of valuing or pricing complex or securitized issues in times of stress or illiquidity. 
 
F. Post-crisis  Outcomes 
 
Institutional interpretations of the recent disruption would examine differences between the 
costs associated with structured transactions for those directly involved and more broadly for 
market valuations at large. The central concern would be to establish whether greater or more 
formal external oversight is needed in the contractual bargaining solutions provided by subprime 
securitization deals if they are perceived to have wider consequences.
129 
 
It would be premature and beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the dislocations so far 
suffered in many national and cross-border markets.
130 However, the immediate effect of the 
shock in the context of securitized instruments is clear, and while it is impossible to know the 
long-term results, it seems feasible to identify the likely focuses of forthcoming resulting 
changes. 
 
                                                 
127 Id., page 3. 
128 Id., pages 23–24. 
129 Similar to the provision of “public goods” through Coasian contractual solutions while avoiding the free- rider concern or costs 
associated with externalities. 
130 The BIS’ first published analysis of the crisis takes 15 June as the start of the period of disruption, which it characterizes as a 
retrenchment in credit conditions leading to a collapse in confidence and acute shortage of liquidity (Fender and Hördalh, 2007).    36
First, this is not only a result of worsening credit conditions, but reflects a fundamental change in 
the transaction costs of future deals resulting from higher regulatory capital charges with fewer 
off-balance sheet vehicles permitted by national regulators or supported by investors. 
 
Second, the structure of certain transactions and in particular of transaction warehousing 
programs is likely to change, with a similar impact on user transaction costs. 
 
Third, a more conservative phase of deal formation and regulation will transpire.
131 This will 
lessen the need for heavy structuring and reliance on selling CDO risk. The basic cash CDO 
and CDO-squared models need more capital so as to attract investors, especially in the sub-
AAA tranches. 
 
Fourth, a long-term change in the regulatory setting for securitized deals seems inevitable, 
covering accounting and capital treatments. It may also embrace aspects of credit risk transfer 
and reporting among non-bank and lightly-regulated entities. Basel II has been assumed to 
remove the balance sheet incentives for banks to set aside sufficient assets and funding to 
conduits, but a response in commercial arbitrage cannot be discounted. The Basel II home-host 
framework needs to be able to prevent or penalize the use of future off-balance sheet conduits. 
 
Fifth, rating agency involvement in structured finance must be reconsidered, as well as the 
concentration hazard of monoline and rating agency sectoral dominance. Rating agencies 
cannot be entrusted with a multiplicity of conflicting responsibilities, and monoline insurers will 
need more capital if they are to continue wrapping the ABS sector.
132 
 
More generally, recent conditions should ultimately lead to less regulatory securitization and 
more economic securitization, which would make East Asia’s securitization prospects conform 
more to general practice. The result is a probable change in deal economics, so that it no longer 
is quite so advantageous for originators and deal brokers to take the most aggressive 
approaches. This includes intermediaries that are capital-regulated, given that they might in 
future be required to grant some element of recourse to investors in structured deals. Basel II 
will make this conservative option more favorable than at present. 
 
A more radical and demanding measure directly relevant to market events in 2007 would be to 
introduce common mechanisms to provide liquidity in the banking or securities markets in times 
of extreme stress. The primary concern would be to avoid or limit contagion after unexpected 
shocks, and might comprise an international lender of last resort combined with new minimum 
liquidity rules for banks and quasi-bank intermediaries. Creating an international lender of last 
resort has been a discussion topic at intervals within Basel and elsewhere, especially when 
prominent banks collapsed in illiquid conditions in the 1970s, but without conclusion.
133 Such 
discussions will continue—especially within the European Union—but there is likely to be little 
real development beyond the increased coordination and temporary liquidity arrangements 
announced in December 2007 among the central banks of the US, eurozone, UK, Switzerland, 
                                                 
131 To which industry representatives will seek to influence, and transaction arrangers then respond. This, together with the future of 
the interactive rating agency model of structured finance were the central concerns of a large number of industry and regulatory 
representatives discussing the future of securitization in New York on 19 September 2007 in a seminar organized by the 
American Securitization Forum (transcripts of which are on file with the authors). 
132 The financial condition of the monocline sector is under intense discussion among market participants, regulators and rating 
agencies at the time of writing, largely as a result of valuation uncertainties in the risks that they insure. 
133 Alford (2005).    37
and Canada.
134 At the same time, Basel Committee members have long felt that liquidity 
regulation was so sensitive to local market practice and national circumstances as to make 
unworkable any common regulatory framework.
135 Nonetheless, there is now agreement within 
the G-7
136 Finance Ministers and Basel Committee to develop an internationally agreed 
approach to liquidity. While this will not be simple to agree, it seems likely that some sort of 
standard will emerge during 2008. This is likely to have a significant impact on the global 
banking markets. 
 
There was not merely a credit downturn in 2007, but a questioning of market practice and 
regulation. Both the intensification of credit risk transfer and the shocks suffered by all credit and 
interest rate markets lead inevitably to concerns for the future of structured finance. Does 
securitization require a defense, given its function in market segments most affected by recent 
losses in confidence? What might improve its outlook and enhance its economic value, given 
that it is impossible to dis-invent cash or synthetic securitized transactions, or generally restrict 
the contractual freedom of commercial market participants? The attractions of wide access to 
sophisticated forms of credit risk transfer have been commonly associated with risk 
management and dispersal, which the financial sector has long taken as valuable. However, the 
outcome of widely spread risks appears to conflict with a rapid assessment of the effects of a 
major shock or resulting loss of confidence. 
 
Thus, the crisis provides a chance for securitization uses to be reconsidered. This could result in 
structured finance relying less on transactional regulatory arbitrage, even if retaining the 
efficiency and risk dispersal features of modern credit risk transfer. The changes in practice 
needed to bring this about include a refocus on transaction economics, greater transparency in 
transaction disclosure, for example in the treatment by banks of SIVs, and in a change in the 
use of tranching and leverage as a means to capture target credit ratings and investor interest. 
 
Regardless of the nature of pool assets, the current practice is for the value available from an 
asset pool over the life of any transaction to be applied in an aggressive waterfall tranching of 
rights, with the aim of obtaining the highest possible credit rating and absolute priority for the 
most senior tranche of securities. The result is an array of junior and deeply subordinated 
tranches, some of which carry a first loss position that cannot be sold to third-party investors. 
 
It may, however, be suitable for users to consider granting an element of recourse to investors 
in a way similar to secured transactions typical of covered bond markets. This would be 
especially appropriate if regulators tighten the rules relating to the off-balance sheet treatment of 
SIVs, or it ceases to be cost effective for originators to retain the most junior tranches of 
securitized deals, given also that Basel II seeks to change the incentives to economic and 
regulatory arbitrage for securitized issuance. Thus a covered claim could form the senior 
tranche of a structured issue, with junior tranches gaining no rights of recourse, but a greater 
share of pool value. 
 
The dispersal of credit risk is not synonymous with problems of SIVs and conduits, which are 
products of regulatory and accounting rules. The BIS view of credit risk transfer was generally 
favorable, even though recognizing risks. It now seems that the dispersal was less widespread 
than predicted, and not in any sense simply a removal of risk from the bank to the non-bank 
                                                 
134 See for example the statement of the Federal Reserve board on 12 December 2007, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
press/monetary/20071212a.htm (accessed 15 December 2007). 
135 Lastra (2006), page 493, notes that an international lender of last resort, however intended, could be no other organization but 
the IMF, which currently lacks the constitutional powers to assume such a function. 
136 The G-7 consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, and US.    38
sector: banks were heavily involved as investors in CDO and ABS markets. Thus the “transfer” 
was incomplete, leading to a popular fear among investors of “not knowing” what risks they 
faced. This was similar to the transformation of the risky to the uncertain in Knightian terms. 
Contracts need to create and sustain incentives to encourage prudent behavior by loan 
servicing agents and others responsible for the administration of supporting risks and reporting 
to investors. Credit rating agencies have a useful corollary function to report on the 
effectiveness of such contracts and administrative performance. 
 
More generally, excessive reliance on quantitative modeling techniques in structured finance 
has lost (at least for the moment) investor and regulator confidence. As a result, quantitative risk 
modeling will be reassessed and is likely to be constrained following a review of the 
securitization framework of Basel II that is already underway, and in the context of IOSCO’s 
review of rating agency activity. In both cases, a much greater granularity and robustness of 
data will be demanded as well as limiting parameters similar to those affecting banks’ internal 
models under the IRB approaches permitted by Basel II. 
 
 
VI.  Securitization’s Future in Asia 
 
The institutional analysis of Section 2 stressed that as a model that represents an alternative to 
locating funding within a conventional economic organization, securitization must always be as 
contractually complete as possible. In that it represents a distinct form of business governance, 
it can succeed only by the intensity and transparency of its contracts and how it is based in 
terms of the appropriateness of the institutional incentive structure and its economic 
assumptions.
137 In the financial sector, the shift of activity through disintermediation may require 
certain aspects of regulation to adapt new approaches and objectives, while events in 2007 are 
likely to lead to this including supervisory features such as common aspirational standards for 
administration contracts in securitized issues, disclosure to investors, and in risk appraisal. This 
may be beneficial in the long-term as a spur to economic securitization in East Asia, where 
structured finance has been slow to develop. 
 
The scale of financial activity in an economy appears to be positively associated with 
securitization use, although certain institutional factors also tend to be influential in developed 
economies where that usage is likely to be greater.
138 If the use of advanced financing 
techniques were merely an evolutionary function of general growth then it might be possible to 
argue that East Asia can expect securitization to develop unassisted as a commercial process. 
But this view has been challenged in a series of studies since the mid-1990s, and is not 
supported by the current extent of the region’s transactional activity. 
 
This section thus considers further incentives to use securitization that might be introduced in 
East Asia, on the basis that national governments continue to promote an increase and 
broadening of structured finance activity for reasons of public policy. However, any such reforms 
will be considered at a time when the intense form of structured finance used outside East Asia 




                                                 
137 Williamson (2005), pages 385–386, shows that “debt is a governance structure that works almost entirely out of rules” contrasted 
with the administrative nature of governance within the firm. 
138 See Appendix 1.    39
A. Rethinking  Securitization 
 
A distinguished economist and central bank advisor has accused “wanton” securitization as 
contributing heavily to the financial market instability of 2007.
139 Others critics suggest that the 
overall scale and intensity of global financial sector activity has become harmful,
140 with the 
implication that banks and markets would be less troublesome if constrained and the financial 
system made less prone to instability. Such views may become commonplace, especially if the 
hardening of credit conditions in North America or Europe has an impact beyond the financial 
sector or in Asia. The financial distress experienced since mid-2007 by large bank 
intermediaries in Canada, France, Germany, UK, and US has inevitably raised political and 
popular concerns. It also gives prominence to attacks on financialization and the increasing 
ubiquity of market-orientated Anglo-American financial systems and corporate governance.
141 It 
is unclear that financialization can easily be lessened but political and regulatory pressure is 
likely to grow increasingly hostile to its continuing to grow without increased restraint. 
 
The major structured finance markets may recover unaided from the dislocations of 2007, but it 
is now likely that national regulators will examine the framework for transactional activity beyond 
the incoming provisions of Basel II. Section 5 argued that regulators and national legislators will 
reevaluate the functioning of securitization markets and intermediaries in the coming months so 
as to reduce the potential for credit risk transfer and structured transactions to lead to severe 
volatility and contagion. Any proposals to extend the use of securitization in East Asia must 
necessarily anticipate where such changes may be concentrated: 
 
•  Limits to permissible activities in terms of transaction types or the actions of 
intermediaries; 
•  Extending risk and transaction disclosure requirements in the banking sector and 
beyond, as well as constraining further regulatory recognition of quantitative internal 
risk modeling systems; 
•  Restricting regulatory capital relief for certain classes of investment or forms of credit 
risk transfer; 
•  Removing or constraining the standing and breadth of involvement of credit rating 
agencies in structured finance transactions,
142 including in relation to setting 
parameters in relation to certain aspects of quantitative modeling to focus on 
transparency and data quality in order to achieve regulatory recognition in a range of 
contexts; 
                                                 
139 Buiter, 2007. 
140  Criticisms of financialization similar to those of Eatwell and Taylor (2000), who favor a protective international regulatory 
hegemon, have been echoed by writers generally supportive of globalization such as Martin Wolf (2007), who observes “the 
transformation of mid-20th century managerial capitalism into global financial capitalism.” This is characterized as a growth in 
financial assets relative to global output, greater transactional disintermediation of traditional intermediaries including banks, 
expansion in new financial instruments and non-bank intermediaries, and greater cross-border financial activity. Thus “[t]he new 
financial capitalism represents the triumph of the trader in assets over the long-term producer […] In the same way, the new 
banking system is dominated by institutions that trade in assets rather than hold them for long periods on their own books.” ibid. 
141  Four semi-discrete definitions of financialization are given in Krippner (2005), page 181. The sustainability of a highly 
financialized system is beyond the scope of this paper, but has been discussed among international political economy scholars 
since Karl Polanyi (1944). Ruggie (1982), Dore (2002) and others suggest that financialization entails increasingly fewer varieties 
of capitalism, so that the German or Japanese models have, since the 1980s, adopted practices associated with Anglo-American 
or common law systems, including structured finance techniques. Thus to Blackburn (2006) “[f]inancialization can most simply be 
defined as the growing and systemic power of finance and financial engineering.” page 39. 
142 A more radical measure would be to require fees for structured finance ratings to be paid by investors or investor representatives, 
but this would introduce wider concerns as to rating agency liability.    40
•  Introducing minimum liquidity provisions similar to limited market-making in identified 
securities markets. This would also help overcome the problem of the absence of 
pricing, making impossible the valuation of CDOs; and 
•  Devising common standards and supervision practice for contractual loan 
monitoring.
143 This could include properly supervised contractual solutions to 
constrain aggressive behavior by specialist loan aggregators. 
At the same time, some of these restrictions may be criticized as denying accepted commercial 
contractual freedoms. They are also likely to spawn new forms of circumvention by encouraging 
a matching wave of transactional regulatory arbitrage. As Basel I led banks to securitize certain 
risks, so new rules would be expected to have an uncertain additional impact on intermediary 
behavior. As a result, regulatory design in order to establish desired incentive frameworks is 
likely to receive increasing attention. 
 
The critical need is to give more attention to disclosure. This implies that such reforms may be 
beneficial to securitization growth in Asia, where corporate governance is often weaker than in 
developed economies, because of its potential to impose contractual governance.
144 
 
B.  Incentives to Securitization in Asia 
 
Commercial interests have long argued that securitization and similar techniques have 
considerable potential in financing in East Asia, and its use is accepted as having been a 
valuable tool in the restructuring of financial sector claims in Korea after 2000. Yet the region’s 
use of securitization is modest compared with North America, Europe, or Australia, despite 
having had the encouragement of many local authorities since the 1997/98 financial crisis. 
Transaction volumes are low relative to economic output except in Korea and Malaysia, and 
unevenly spread across the region. Persistent institutional obstacles to regional capital flows 
indicate that the post-crisis motivation for legal and regulatory reform has dissipated. 
 
This prompts the question as to whether this aspect of financial development in Asian markets 
lags other regions as a function of a time dynamic, as a matter of national institutional 
conditions, or as the result of certain economic conditions such as national savings and 
investment imbalances or relatively high private sector liquidity. It was widely accepted by the 
mid-1960s that financial sector development could be identified by the extent of financial 
intermediation within an economy. 
 
Economies with relatively high financial intermediation ratios were seen as likely to be home to 
sophisticated banks and other intermediaries. After the onset of post-Bretton Woods 
deregulation in the mid-1970s, this came to be associated with increasingly freer choices in 
financial instruments for savers and users of funds. As a result, a view emerged in the 1980s 
that financial systems generally follow a path of evolution that begins with banks monopolizing 
the intermediation of savings and investment, proceeding to mixed banking-capital market 
intermediation, and finally to a configuration where financial activity takes place largely across 
                                                 
143 A model for instituting standard practice could be taken from residential mortgage agencies such as the US Federal Home Loan 
Corporation, Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation (HKMC), or Korea’s KHFC. Note that the supervision of contractual performance 
is one aspect of the Anglo-American market-oriented model that is unsuited to structured finance, since breaches of contract 
under common law systems customarily induce compensation in damages rather than enforcement by performance. 
144 See Footnote 137. Note also that compliance and supervision must apply equally to state-controlled banks.    41
open securities markets.
145 This evolutionary concept sees a “securitized phase” as the pinnacle 
of financial sector development,
146 which is expected to result from growth in output. 
 
This paper shows that the growth in securitization in Asia is the result in part of elective strategy, 
in that governments and regulatory authorities can introduce, or fail to introduce institutional 
changes that encourage or discourage financial development.
147 That securitization has lagged 
expectations in several East Asian markets results partly from institutional constraints, and 
suggests that governments have elected to give only limited or cautious support to market 
reforms. That the need for securitization to assist financial development in East Asia has 
dissipated since 1999–2000 does not invalidate the proposition that it can be of value in risk 
management or as an alternative channel for intermediation. This is the basis for promoting 
institutional change and policy reform. The implication would be a greater reliance on the public 
and private securities markets in capital funding and portfolio investment, compared to an 
historic emphasis on national banking systems that characterizes both industrialized and 
developing East Asian economies. However, such changes require policy support and relevant 
institutional action. 
 
If structured finance is accepted as value-creating, what might advance its use in Asia, and what 
limits such use now? For example, can development organizations usefully support institutional 
reforms? This would include strengthening property rights, judicial processes, promoting 
minimum standards among lenders for risk appraisal, data collection and analysis, establishing 
common best practices in documentation and risk appraisal among intermediaries, in tandem 
with regulatory enhancements.
148 It could also include support for securitization to fund lending 
in areas of interest for public policy, such as infrastructural risks, education, and agricultural or 
community finance. For multilateral bodies to become intermediaries in such areas may be an 
original and non-conflicting use of capital, with identifiable goals in poverty reduction and 
incentives for resource development. 
 
Even if fully practical, these schemes strain to find support from traditional commercial 
sources.
149 The scope for multilateral involvement may be constrained by conflicts associated 
with credit risk transfer at a time when national supervision and reporting among substandard 
bank and non-bank intermediaries needs enhancement. However, support for implementation of 
the second and third pillars of Basel II would be beneficial in this respect, and might contribute 
to regional cooperation among national authorities. 
 
Successful securitization programs can lead to migration among source asset originators to 
common standards for facility appraisal, documentation, and enforcement. For example, in 
Hong Kong, China, competition in the last decade in the market for residential mortgage loans 
has led to sharp reductions in gross loan margins. Such gains for borrowers are due in part to 
the creation of the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation (HKMC), which refinances housing loans 
and has induced a general improvement and standardization of primary loan documentation and 
                                                 
145 Rybczynski (1997). Although the theory sees institutions such as property rights as important catalysts in the evolutionary 
process, it regards the legal and regulatory framework as endogenous to growth in output and per capita income, and is thus 
challenged by empirical findings of causal relationships between financial development and general growth, and between the 
nature of legal systems and financial development. 
146 Id., page 9. 
147 This analysis builds on a general framework developed in Arner (2007). 
148 A more detailed discussion is given in Arner (2007). 
149 Without incentives, banks may elect not to lend for such purposes or do so only with severe limits, especially given Asia’s modest 
record of financial innovation. An excess of non-deployed personal savings has long been seen as an obstacle to economic 
growth, see notably Lewis (1955), pages 213–244.    42
credit appraisal, since loan originators must meet HKMC requirements in order to secure credit 
insurance (necessary for loan-to-value ratios greater than 70%) or subsequent loan sales. In 
due course this will assist in the diversification of investor classes, and lower the average 
expenses associated with serial securitizations.
150 
 
C. New  Initiatives 
 
Examples of initiatives open to transnational organizations to encourage the use of 
securitization include three concepts: 
 
•  Supporting refunding of microfinance lenders to agricultural or community based 
projects.
151 This can be quite significant in developing financial systems where there 
is frequently a liquidity constraint on microfinance providers facing increasing 
demand for their products. This is also true for established banks with excess 
liquidity but unwilling to lend to borrowers outside traditional large corporations.
152 
This would require a contingent commitment of capital, as well as resources to help 
standardize credit appraisal and loan execution. Such efforts could be supported not 
only at the domestic level, but perhaps at the regional level as well, providing support 
for regional standards, transparency, and products with the potential to develop 
liquidity; 
 
•  Providing credit support and refunding for long-term loans to students and for human 
resource development.
153 Student loans (where available) tend to be treated as 
unsecured personal lending and are costly. New mechanisms would require 
incentive structures to encourage repayment, perhaps through changes to 
insolvency laws or taxation systems. There may also be scope for microfinance 
providers to engage in student loan financing which could be given by third-party 
credit support; 
 
•  The funding and redistribution of infrastructural finance. Projects not associated with 
revenue generation may be assisted with structured finance techniques, especially 
when state or provincial revenue raising is inefficient. For example, the securitization 
                                                 
150 KHFC was created for similar purposes, but as yet has had only a modest effect in stimulating or extending the duration of 
residential mortgage lending, see Footnote 43. 
151 Structured funding for established microfinance providers is conceptually new and modest in scale, but has been shown to be 
feasible by a small number of similar transactions for lenders in South Asia, Latin America, and Eastern European transition 
economies. In some cases, funding has been arranged or supported by non-profit, non-governmental organizations or public 
developmental intermediaries such as the Dutch Nederlandse Financierings-Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden (FMO) or 
Germany’s KfW Bankengruppe (KfW). Each of the latter provided credit enhancement through partial guarantees of a 2006 pass-
through loan sale program for Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), an established Bangladesh microlender. 
BRAC’s first tranche of short-term notes was given internal credit enhancement through over-collateralization, with notes carrying 
pool claims of 150% of their nominal value. Program issuance may eventually reach Tk12.6 billion ($183 million), with notes 
expected to be issued twice annually. The most sophisticated transaction disclosed to date to securitize microfinance claims may 
be a $106 million 2006 CLO for Blue Orchid Finance, a specialist lender to microfinance intermediaries, which comprises two 
tranches with average lives of up to 5 years and which uses a pool of loans to microfinance providers in 13 different states, but 
unlike the BRAC program, investors in this transaction obtain claims against intermediaries, rather than any ultimate borrowers. 
152 Cambodia provides an excellent example: see Royal Government of Cambodia (2007). 
153 It is common for commercial or subsidized student loans to be funded or refinanced with structured finance techniques, including 
securitization. The example best known to the capital markets is SLM Corporation or “Sallie Mae,” a former government agency 
that is one of a number of specialist US intermediaries providing student loans with public sector support. Sallie Mae, its affiliates, 
and similar organizations obtain commercial funding through many markets and financing structures, including substantial 
student loan ABS programs. Student loans have been packaged and sold as pools on more modest scales by banks and 
agencies elsewhere, including Korea. Separately, a number of universities in North America and Europe have borrowed in the 
commercial markets using forward sales of revenue as collateral, for example from student tuition or accommodation fees.    43
of future tax receipts may provide a funding source for new projects, while the 
covered bond concept has scope to refinance public sector claims. 
 
These examples share aims that are simple and involve programs that the commercial finance 
sector is unable or unwilling to create without external assistance. In a global climate of 
regulatory and systemic reform, such concepts will help regenerate economic securitization in 
East Asia, with a range of consequent developmental benefits. 
 
In addition, as policy responses develop from 2007’s market dislocation, Asia’s regulators and 
governments could usefully consider regional specifications of new or revised global standards 
for intermediary liquidity, rating agency practice and certification, and Basel II treatment of 
securitization.
154 In the longer-term it may also be prudent to examine new arrangements among 
East Asian central banks to share resources to deal with liquidity disruptions involving Asian 
financial markets or intermediaries.
155 Cross-border financial intermediation in Asia is currently 
insufficient to make such arrangements a necessity, but if financial market liberalization 
continues it would be beneficial to consider wide-ranging contingencies in advance of any actual 
need, as has been shown in the approach to crisis and liquidity arrangements made by the 




























                                                 
154 Through the established forums of ASEAN, ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit, APEC finance minister processes, Executives Meeting 
of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP), and IOSCO’s Asia-Pacific committee. 
155 The Chang Mai Initiative (CMI) among ASEAN+3 central banks provides a network of short–term foreign exchange swap lines 
intended for currency crisis management, the use of which is largely subject to exacting conditions. CMI includes bilateral lines 
opened by the PRC, Japan, and Korea each with the middle-income ASEAN members that also allow limited securities 
repurchase agreements, see Arner, Lejot and Wang (2008).    44
Appendixes 
 
Appendix 1.  Effects of Financial Market Development on Securitization 
 
Factors influencing the extent of securitization were estimated with a series of linear 
regressions, using as dependent variables a series of measures of securitization market 
capitalization and issuance. These included total outstanding structured issues across five asset 
classes, namely ABS and MBS issues, pfandbriefe, other covered issues, and cash CDOs.
156 
Independent variables were: 
 
1.  gross domestic product as a measure of economic development; 
2.   financial market deepening as a proxy for the importance of the financial sector in 
national economies; 
3.   an index of rule of law as a proxy for the quality of national legal systems and 
judicial processes;
157 
4.  an index of capital controls as a measure of financial openness;
158  
5.  credit creation measured by bank lending to the non-financial sector, the 
commercial real estate sector, and to residential mortgages as a share of total bank 
lending; 
6.   quality of bank lending, as shown by NPLs share of total loans; 
7.    bank capital adequacy ratios as a measure of the robustness of financial 
intermediaries. 
 
These estimates were made in each case using annual data for 16 developed and developing 
economies for 1995–2006.
159    No  distinction  was made between securitization use and its 
contractual or legal feasibility in any jurisdiction, so that the results of these estimates should be 
read in the context of the information given in the table in Appendix 5. 
 
Three sets of regressions were run: 
 
1.  Pooled data (combinations of time-series and cross-sectional observations); 
2.    Panel data (combinations of time-series and cross-section observations taking 
account of country-specific effects); 
3.  Regressions with interaction dummy variables to capture differences in projected 
slopes between the two developed and emerging economy samples. 
 
  The regression equations take the following forms: 
 
 Without  interaction: 
 
                                                 
156 Covered bonds include synthetic (contractual) issues such as those made to date by UK or US issuers see Appendix 3. 
157 The Rule of Law Index is one of six World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators assembled from many sources. It measures 
“the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007, pages 3–8). 
Other World Bank data on the control of corruption and regulatory quality were tested as explanatory variables and found to be 
insignificant. 
158 Controls on capital transactions as published in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, IMF. 
159  The developed economies are Australia; Canada; Denmark; France; Hong Kong, China; Japan; Singapore; UK and US. 
Developing economies are the PRC, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam.    45
Securitization = β0 + βX + ε 
 
 With  interaction: 
 
  Securitization = β0 + βX*EmergingEastAsia + θX*DevelopedEconomies + ε 
 
where Securitization is total securitization, including ABS and MBS outstandings, X represents 
the independent variables, and <EmergingEastAsia> and <DevelopedEconomies> are dummy 
variables for country groupings. 
 
 
Table A1.1: Summary of Variables and Expected Signs 
Gross domestic product  + 
Financial market deepening  + 
Bank lending  + 
Rule of law  + 
Capital controls  - 
NPLs + 
Capital adequacy   +/- 
 
 
Results and Interpretation 
 
The three methods show significant results for the developed economies but generally weaker 
results for emerging East Asian economies. The depth of securitization measured by total 
securitization, ABS and MBS thus appears to be aligned with the development of financial 
markets as measured by financial market deepening, selected indicators of credit creation, 
growth in GDP, aggregate bank capital adequacy and the extent of NPLs. Rule of law and 
capital controls showed significant but less consistent results for developed economies, and 
insignificant results for the emerging economies tested. 
 
Estimates for developed economies indicate that financial market deepening contributes 
positively to the use of securitization, where such deepening is given by the aggregate relative 
to GDP of bank credit creation and outstanding capitalization of national bond and equity 
markets. Significant results were found for the emerging economies tested using pooled data for 
MBS. As financial markets grow in scale and sophistication, so the propensity of intermediaries 
to engage in credit risk transfer and demand among investors for a broadening range of risks 
and instruments can both be generally expected to increase. If successful, securitization can be 
said to lower the transaction costs associated with credit risk transfer and increase the 
availability of transferable debt instruments. 
 
Significant results were found for the effect of credit creation on total securitization for all 
economies and on MBS issuance in developed economies. No measure of credit creation had a 
particular value in explaining growth in total securitization, or either ABS or MBS growth. To the 
extent that the results indicate that credit creation is positively related to the use of    46
securitization, the underlying reasons may be associated with transaction arrangers thus having 
more feasible commercial sources of suitable pool assets or risks. 
 
The estimates also suggest that securitization use increases with economic growth. But it is 
clear that national institutional factors may hinder its effectiveness or development. This is seen 
most clearly in the PRC, where despite a record of consistently high growth, the policy, 
legislative and regulatory setting have to date allowed very few securitization transactions. 
 
A further analysis was made excluding data for US securitization. This seeks to reflect the view 
of US financial market practices being path dependent upon institutions and circumstances that 
are unusual or unique at the federal or state level, rather than internationally common.
160 For 
example, the origins of ABS and RMBS transactions in the 1970s in the US lay in long-standing 
geographical and commercial restrictions on banks of all kinds that provided strong incentives to 
disintermediation, and subsequently led to  unprecedented growth in activity among 
nontraditional financial interests. 
 
This would not be inconsistent with the view that innovation in US financial markets may have 
applications elsewhere in both common law and other jurisdictions, but that US practice may not 
necessarily be a benchmark for all other states. Thus to the extent that financial innovation in 
the US results from atypical domestic institutions such as the nature of law and regulation, then 
the inclusion of US data may have a distorting effect on the regression results. 
 
The results, excluding US issuance, are generally less significant in respect of the developed 
economy sample, and become insignificant in relation to the emerging economies tested. In this 
respect, the findings appear to conform with those contained in a recent study of housing 
finance in 61 states and territories—first, that the depth of housing finance in the economy 
measured by the share of outstanding residential mortgage debt is on average higher in 
developed economies, and second, that countries’ larger housing finance systems are positively 
associated with institutions such as legal rights and efficient credit information provisions.
161 
This suggests that such institutions favor the making and maintenance of housing finance, 
whether by intermediaries or through the contractual process offered by securities markets. 
 
These findings are also supported by measures of both the rule of law and cross- border capital 
controls, each of which was found to be significant for developed economies but insignificant for 
the emerging economies sample. The rule of law is likely to influence the use of securitization 
through its effect on investor confidence and market microstructures. Trust in the judicial system 
for the unbiased enforcement of claims is typically perceived to be weaker in emerging 
economies than others. It is widely acknowledged that a supportive legal and regulatory 
framework will help to avoid eroding the contractual integrity of legitimate transactions, for 
example, so that a transfer of assets is reliable, permanent and may not be disturbed by 
subsequent claims. However, it must be noted that the rule of law variable is defined in broad 
terms and lacks precision. 
 
Controls on capital impact negatively on securitization by limiting the extent and diversity of 
investor participation. The need for prior approval for the purchase or sale of financial assets by 
nonresidents, withholding taxes on foreign payments or to offshore transactional SPVs, and 
restrictions on the use of financial derivatives may all discourage cross-border participation in 
local markets. Limits on trading and transfer will in turn have a limiting effect on securitization, 
                                                 
160 See notably Roe (1994), pages 54–59 and pages 94–101. 
161 Warnock and Warnock (2007), pages 14–16.    47
even though states that discourage foreign participation may still sustain vibrant capital markets: 
Korea is a prominent example. 
 
The estimates showed a negative relationship between NPL volumes and securitization for 
developed economies. No effect was seen in respect of the emerging economies tested. This 
may be explained by differences in national accounting and reporting requirements, 
notwithstanding harmonization trends in bank regulation and the fact that reported NPLs have 
generally fallen since the 1997/1998 financial crisis. In the case of the developed economy 
sample, securitization is traditionally rarely used in respect of NPL recycling in European civil 
law jurisdictions. Regulatory standards that demand prompt loan loss disclosure and 
provisioning may have restricted its use elsewhere. A rise in NPL securitization may follow in 
due course from the deterioration in conditions in residential mortgage lending since late 2006 in 
the US and other Anglo- American economies. 
 
Taking data limitations into consideration, the bifurcated development of East Asian structured 
finance reported in this study, with a separation between usage in Hong Kong, China; Japan; 
Korea; and Malaysia from the PRC, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand can be attributed in 
part to the effectiveness of enabling law. While the results confirm that common law jurisdictions 
are comparatively felicitous in providing for effective securitization, the example of Korea shows 
that other jurisdictions can present a highly effective setting for such activity. Future research 
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Table A1.2: Selected Pooled Regression Estimates with Interaction Dummies, 1995–2006 
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Adjusted R-squared  0.739 0.493 0.952 0.739 0.493 0.952 
Observations  96 124 149  96 124 149 
 
Notes: 
Parentheses denote t-values in absolute terms. 
*  significance at the 10% level. 
**   significance at the 5% level. 
***  significance at the 1% level. 
 














    49
Table A1.3: Complete Pooled Regressions Estimates with Interaction Dummies, 1995-2006
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Constant -67.175  -486.185 -262.078 
 (1.604)  (0.987)  (0.807) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.716  0.843  0.839 
Observations 96  123  147 
 
Notes: 
Parentheses denote t-values in absolute terms. 
*  significance at the 10% level. 
**  significance at the 5% level. 
*** significance at the 1% level. 
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Appendix 2.  Cash and Synthetic Generic Transactions  
 







Financial assets are sold by their originator to an insubstantive SPV in a shared domicile,162 
and simultaneously resold to a second offshore SPV that in turn funds the purchase, 
immediately or after a short period for asset accumulation, with an array of new securities 
enjoying direct claims of varying seniority over all or part of the pool of assets (Figure A2.1). 
 






In Figure A2.2, “cross-border” indicates the use of SPVs remote from the source assets, located 
offshore as a means to safeguard an irrevocable asset transfer. Securities created with the sale 
may be acquired at issue or later by any investor, whether or not of the same domicile from 
which subject assets are first sold. 
 
Qualifying assets may include impaired assets, commercial mortgage loans, corporate loans 
and major lease receivables. Asset servicing becomes independent of the originator. The 
originator may continue to deal commercially with any ultimate debtor except in cases involving 
impaired assets but may not usually derive ongoing economic benefits from claims becoming 




                                                 
162 The domestic domiciled SPV.    51





Securities (typically notes, bonds or commercial paper) are issued in tranches to meet required 
target credit ratings and the risk-return preferences of various segmented classes of investors 
while extracting the fullest economic use of pool cash or proceeds. 
 
Value is first extracted from the asset pool internally. External sources of credit then provide 
additional tangible contingent support such that each series of bonds meets a target initial credit 
rating. This is achieved through iterative consultation between transaction arrangers and at least 
one rating agency. 
 
Such external backing is facilitated by additional third party support, for example by means of 
funded or contingent capital, guarantees or dedicated insurance. It may cover defaults within the 
collateral pool or an entire transaction, and in cross-currency transactions will include specific 
credit support to induce the participation of a currency swap counterparty. 
 
 





Synthetic transactions achieve one facet of cash transactions by providing originators with credit 
risk support through an array of credit derivatives, thus altering the risk composition of the 
source balance sheet. Investors thus enter a transaction with different legal rights from a cash 
securitization, but which may fully replicate the risk-return qualities of one or more tranches of 
such a transaction.    52
This generic example is a template for more complex deals. Proceeds from the sale of 
securities are devoted to buying credit protection structured to meet the expected risk 
performance of the originator’s asset pool. In effect, the originator buys bespoke credit 
protection funded by the sale of an irrevocable interest in its risk portfolio. 
 
Assuming identical regulatory treatment, the significant difference in transaction economics 
between cash and synthetic deals is that the proceeds of the sale of securities remain within 
synthetic transactions and can assist in servicing the claims of investors, for example by making 
or replenishing a cash reserve for scheduled payments. 
 
The transaction economics of synthetic structures are aimed to a greater extent than cash deals 
towards credit rating augmentation. This requires an array of CDS, and a diversified investor 
base that allows the sale of deeply subordinated tranches, or “equity”. In many cases prior to 
the 2007 market dislocation, these most junior claims would be retained by the originating bank, 
and thus erode the regulatory capital advantages of the overall transaction. Basel II removes the 
incentive for this approach in all but the most extreme cases, for example, a highly over-
capitalized closely-held bank. 
 
 






       Figure A2.6: CDO Payment Waterfall 
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Appendix 3.  Covered Bonds 
 
This form of secured finance is widely seen as related to securitization. It has long been used in 
Denmark and Germany, and with incentives created by EU Directives, is now popular elsewhere 
in Western Europe and certain transition states. Covered bonds share two main objectives of 
cash securitization: to assist in funding by financial intermediaries, and provide relatively 
homogeneous risks to investors. However, they are distinct in creating a security interest for 
investors. Covered bond holders obtain preferential rights over pools of claims that remain 
funded assets on the balance sheet of the originating intermediary. Those assets “cover” the 
new transaction as dedicated collateral, without the irrevocable transfer associated with 
securitization. 
 
Covered bonds (first known in Germany as “pfandbriefe”) typically offer a funding cost 
advantage compared to securitized transactions since bond holders retain rights of recourse to 
the originator. As a result, conventionally they require less intensive structuring or credit 
enhancement.
163 Importantly, covered bonds are customarily associated with substantive 
intermediaries or their guaranteed subsidiaries, but may involve the use of SPVs, usually as a 
function of the operation of law. In contrast to cash securitizations, such vehicles will often be 
substantive in having dedicated management and administrative resources.
164 
 
Covered bonds are primarily associated with European civil law jurisdictions. They resulted from 
legislation supporting development and social policy objectives begun in Denmark from 1850 in 
Germany from 1900 and more recently encouraged by an EU Directive in 1988.
165 Most create 
collateral pools from residential mortgages or loans made by specialist lenders for public 
infrastructure purposes. Since 2002, the market’s accelerated growth has resulted largely from 
incentives created by several further EU Directives. Total covered bond outstandings in Europe 
exceeded €1.8 trillion ($2.35 trillion) as at end-2005, with German issues accounting for 
approximately 60% of the total.
166 Denmark, France, Spain and Sweden also saw significant 
new issue volumes. Gross European issuance was approximately €475 billion ($620 billion) in 
2005, with Germany and Denmark contributing the largest amounts. 
 
The major distinction between covered bonds and securitization is conceptual, as a secured 
loan rather than the sale of future claims. Covered bonds require no transfer of pool assets to 
an SPV, although certain states stipulate that pool loans be housed in a dedicated subsidiary. In 
Europe, covered structures have assumed an importance and scale similar to the US RMBS 
market, but the concept is not entirely unknown elsewhere: secured loan transactions have 
been used elsewhere as funding tools, for example by the Federal Home Loan Banks in the US. 
As an historical idea, the covered bond was first associated with the needs of public policy, or 
public lending intermediaries, which have been common in different forms to most advanced 
economies. 
 
The EU’s Consolidated Banking Directive and Capital Requirements Directive (implementing 
Basel II) now encourage investment in covered bonds by allowing EU bank holders a 10% risk 
asset weighting if the bonds meet UCITS conditions. Other rules permit covered mortgage 
                                                 
163 “Structured” covered bonds simulate the generic “cash” form as a contractual solution for issuers domiciled in jurisdictions lacking 
suitable enabling legislation. As at 30 June 2007 this included the Netherlands, UK, and US. 
164  For example, French covered bond law effectively requires that pool assets subject to covered issuance be held and 
administered in a separate “new” bank. 
165 Directive on Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS), 1985. 
166 Source: European Covered Bond Council.    54
bonds that conform with national laws to be used as central bank borrowing collateral in the 
same way as sovereign bonds.
167 Others exempt covered issues from prudential limits to risk 
concentration. Almost all EU Member States have enacted covered bond legislation, including 
common law Ireland. The UK is likely to introduce similar enabling legislation in 2008: until now, 
UK issuers have used structured transactions to simulate traditional covered bonds, but at a 
marginal cost disadvantage.
168 Nonetheless, the scale of UK issues has been notable since the 
first issue in 2003. Two substantial US mortgage lenders issued structured covered bonds in 
Europe in 2006–07, but without interest among domestic US investors. 
 
Recent price and liquidity disruptions have not neglected the covered bond market, in spite of 
claims to the contrary.
169 However, with changes in investor preferences made apparent in the 
2007 credit crisis, as international bodies consider regulatory responses, and as Basel II alters 
potential securitization transaction economics for most loan originators and in a range of states, 
the major capital markets may find a greater prominence for the covered structure, with 
transactions that combine certain advantages from both securitized and covered issues. This 
has become a feature of the covered bond market in Spain, and after the return of generally 
normal conditions may beadopted more widely. Creating a covered tranche within a securitized 
transaction alleviates the need for aggressively tiered payment priorities among the classes of 
issue that make up the overall transaction. The covered tranche replaces all or part of a super- 




















                                                 
167 This dispensation was afforded from its inception by the European Central Bank, but only adopted in extremis by the Bank of 
England in September 2007. 
168 See H. M. Treasury and Financial Services Authority (2007). Legislation would grant regulatory capital treatment to holders of 
covered bonds in the form specified in various EU directives and thus remove the current cost disadvantage to potential UK 
covered issuers. 
169 BIS analysts claim that 
the valuation of covered bonds in recent years has been rather robust to shocks to both issuer creditworthiness 
and the value of the underlying collateral. 
Packer, Stever and Upper (2007) page 43. However, the study fails to assess price or liquidity reactions of outstanding covered 
bonds or the feasible pricing of new issues following major disruptions. In one example (International Financing Review 2007b):  
After weeks of secondary illiquidity with covered bond traders defecting from their posts, all hopes had been 
firmly placed with the primary side to bring stability. […] In an environment where traders were struggling to call 
the correct market level, a repricing was almost inevitable.    55
Appendix 4.  Enabling Legislation and Regulation 
 
The following table lists major national reforms to assist securitization.
170 
 
Table A4: Enabling Legislation and Regulation 
  Years of enactment or proclamation 
China, People’s  Rep. of  Major bank sector securitization legislation under preparation 2007-08. Limited trial deals 
permitted by banking and securities regulators in 2006-07. 
Hong Kong, China  Permissive legal framework, except for conflicts with bankruptcy laws arising in certain 
future flow transactions. 
Indonesia  Pre-1997 securitization decrees. 
2002-03 securities regulator guidelines. 
Japan  Perfection Law 1998. 
Asset Liquidation Law 1998/2000. 
Trust Business Law (Amendment) 2004. 
Korea, Rep. of  1998 Asset-backed Securities Law. 
1999 Mortgage-backed Securities Law. 
2003 Korea Housing Finance Corporation Law. 
Malaysia  Generally permissive common law legal framework, except for future flow transactions. 
Well-established legal framework for Islamic securitized issues. 
Philippines  2002 Special Purpose Vehicle Act, Republic Act No. 9182, enacted 2003. 
2004 Securitization Act, Republic Act No. 9567 (largely untested). 
Implementing Rules and Regulations (2005) over credit rating requirements and the use 
of SPVs. 
Singapore  Permissive legal framework, except for conflicts with bankruptcy laws arising in certain
future flow transactions. 
Highly supportive REIT regulatory code 2001-05, Business Trust Act 2004. 
Thailand  1997 securitization decree. 
2003 Asset-backed Securitization Act. 
2004 Special Purpose Vehicle Act. 
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Table A5 gives an assessment of prevailing securitization market conditions across selected 
regional economies.
171 The table’s assessments of the effectiveness of enabling legal provisions 
(column 2), the enforcement of foreclosure or repossession of source assets (column 5), and 
ongoing threats to the integrity of transfer of assets to a SPV (column 6) are in each case based 
on transactional evidence and appraisals of governing laws. The PRC and Viet Nam have been 
excluded from the table due to policy decisions to withhold full support from market 
development. In addition, the PRC’s recent bankruptcy and property legislation and the ongoing 
process of regulatory implementation make the treatment of these issues indeterminate, even 
were transactions to become more freely permitted. 
 
In most jurisdictions transactional integrity has yet to be tested through a complete credit cycle. 
This would apply even in common law jurisdictions such as Singapore and Hong Kong, China, 
for example, in relation to new rules permitting the creation of REITs, although in each case the 


































                                                 
171 See also Arner, Booth, Lejot and Hsu (2007). 
172 One substantial public sector REIT transaction in Hong Kong, China for The Link Real Estate Investment Trust was subject to 
litigation that sought to prohibit its launch. Completion eventually took place in November 2005. 
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